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Tort Claims as Intangible Property:
An Exploration from an Assignee's
Perspective
By HAROLD R. WEINBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Dean Prosser has pointed out that a major function of the
law of torts is to allocate losses arising in the course of human
activity by placing the burden of the loss on the party at fault.'
Tort causes of action are both diverse and plentiful in our so-
ciety, and few persons can avoid being a tort victim at one time
or another. Prior to suit, the injured party becomes the
"owner" of a tort cause of action. Even though "ownership" is
involved, it may seem awkward to classify a tort cause of action
as personal property. This difficulty is lessened, however, when
the monetary value of the cause of action is established through
settlement with the tortfeasor or by a court rendered judgment.
In any event, our law recognizes that many tort causes of ac-
tion, as well as rights pursuant to tort settlement or judgment,
are as assignable as most personalty. Despite this situation, the
origins, evolution, and present state of the law concerning the
inherent assignability of tort claims in the United States has
never been subjected to close analysis and comment.2 This is
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1966, Western Reserve
University; J.D. 1969, Case Western Reserve University; LL.M. 1975, University of
Illinois.
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 5-6 (4th ed. 1971).
2 The periodic literature dealing with this topic is generally narrow in its focus,
usually dealing with a recent development in a single jurisdiction. See Flannagan,
Assignability of Insured's Cause of Action forBad Faith or Negligent Refusal to Settle,
1970 INS. L.J. 151 (1970) (discussing Kansas law); Comment, Assignability of Causes
of Action in Tort-Fraud, 3 DAKOTA L. REV. 265 (1930); Comment, Statutes-Survival
of Causes of Action-Effect of Survival on Assignability, 27 N.D.L. REv. 208 (1951);
Note, Assignment of Tort Claims in Pennsylvania, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 123 (1953); Note,
Obligor's Right of Set-Off Against Assigned Causes of Action, 17 S.C.L. REV. 231
(1965); Note, Assignment of Tort Causes of Action in Utah, 4 UTAH L. REV. 539 (1955);
Note, Assignability of a Tort Cause of Action in Virginia, 41 VA. L. REv. 687 (1955);
22 CALIF. L. Rv. 456 (1934); 20 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177 (1942); 41 HAnv. L. REv. 666
(1928); 18 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1934); 24 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1940); 85 U. PA. L. REV.
637 (1937); 4 TENN. L. REV. 25 (1925). The legal encyclopedias and annotations provide
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somewhat surprising in light of the substantial body of legal
literature relating to the inherent assignability of rights ex
contractu,3 and the fact that in some jurisdictions certain tort
claims remain unassignable, a remnant of the archaic and out-
moded English doctrine which prohibited assigning choses in
action.' Also neglected by the commentators' has been the ef-
fect of such tort claim assignments on the parties to the assign-
ment inter se and third persons not parties to the assignment.'
This absence of analysis is also perplexing because tort claims
have been assigned to meet a variety of commercial and non-
commercial needs, and questions relating to the validity and
effect of such assignments have been litigated.7 This paper will
attempt to fill these commentary voids.
II. THE INHERENT ASSIGNABILITY OF TORT CAUSES OF ACTION AND
THE RIGHTS DERIVED THEREFROM
Tort causes of action are, in themselves, a form of intangi-
ble property, but they can also constitute the precursor of other
future intangible property rights.8 These include a tort victim's
right to payment under a settlement contract, a creditor's
rights under a judgment, and rights in the fund which is ulti-
mately produced by the tortfeasor in compliance with the set-
tlement or judgment Therefore, when discussing the inherent
a more comprehensive, but nonanalytic, source for finding the doctrine. See 6 AM.
JUR.2D Assignments §§ 34-45 (1963); 6 C.J.S. Assignments §§ 32-37 (1937); Annot., 76
A.L.R.2d 1286 (1961).
3 See notes 27-35 infra.
See notes 14-18 and accompanying text infra.
See note 2 supra.
6 Such persons might include the tortfeasor, creditors of the assignor, or other
assignees.
' See pt. III infra.
For an analysis of the evolution of these tort-related rights, see notes 157-61 and
accompanying text infra. The "evolution" of one intangible into another is not limited
to tort causes of action and the rights which may be derived from them. The manner
in which intangible rights included within the scope of Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code may "evolve" into other intangible rights also included within the
scope of that article has been discussed elsewhere. See generally Coogan, Intangibles
as Collateral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 997, 999-1006
(1964). Neither tort claims nor tort judgments are within the scope of Article Nine.
However, a right to payment under a settlement contract or in the fund ultimately
generated may be. See pt. III infra.
9 Of course, a tort claim will be valueless to an assignee if there is no chance that
it will be merged into a settlement or a judgment which will produce a fund.
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assignability of rights arising from a tort, these derivative in-
tangible property rights as well as a tort victim's original cause
of action must be considered. Their assignability becomes even
more significant because although it may not be possible to
assign the tort cause of action directly, it may be possible to
do so indirectly by assigning the future derivative rights.
The American approach to the assignment of tort claims
is based on the supposed equivalency of survivability and as-
signability. That is, if a tort claim does not die with the tort
victim, but can be sued upon by the victim's personal repre-
sentative, it is deemed to be assignable by the victim inter
vivos.10 The origin of this equivalency, which has been de-
scribed as "obscure,"" is usually traced to Comegys v. Vasse,
1 2
a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1828.
However, Comegys was not the first American opinion to refer
to the equivalency; in fact, the decision may not have even
relied on its application.13 Since the origins and evolution of the
American doctrine can be better understood and appreciated
when viewed against a backdrop of prior English law, the story
of tort claim assignability in the United States is best begun
in England.
A. The English Background
The English characterized a claim arising out of the com-
mission of a tort as a chose in action, a classification used to
denote those personal property rights not susceptible to physi-
cal possession and capable of enforcement only through legal
action. 4 This grouping embraced a number of claims, includ-
ing "rights to debts of all kinds, and rights of action on a
contract or a right to damages for its breach; rights arising by
" See generally the materials cited at note 2 supra. Although the assignment of
tort claims has been the subject of statutory enactment in a few jurisdictions, this
equivalency remains the basic conceptual thread running through the law dealing with
the assignment of rights arising out of the commission of a tort. See notes 111-115 and
accompanying text infra.
" Note, Assignment of Tort Causes of Action in Utah, 4 UTAH L. REV. 539, 541
n.15 (1955).
22 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828).
, See notes 70-90 and accompanying text infra.
, See generally 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 515-17 (1926)
[hereinafter cited as HOLDSWORTH].
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reason of the commission of a tort or other wrong; and rights
to recover the ownership or possession of property real or per-
sonal.",
5
At one time in England all choses in action were nonas-
signable. Several explanations for this rule have been ad-
vanced, e.g., they were too personal to transfer, there was a
prohibition against maintenance,"6 or valuation was too diffi-
cult.' 7 However, this blanket prohibition against assignability
eventually weakened, so that rights arising out of the commis-
sion of a tort had developed a modicum of assignability in
England before Comegys was decided.' 8 The assignability of
tort claims first emerged as the product of legislative action.
Beginning in 1330, the English enacted a series of statutes
which permitted executors and administrators to sue for tres-
passes committed against personal property of the decedent
during his lifetime,'" and which were thus in derogation of the
common law principle actio personalis moritur cum persona (a
personal action dies with the person). 0 It is interesting to note
that although survivability is in some ways analogous to as-
" Id. at 516. The inclusion of nonpossessory interests in real or personal property
under the heading "chose in action" has been questioned. See Bordwell, The Alienabil-
ity of Nonpossessory Interests, 19 N.C.L. REv. 279, 279-85 (1941). The inclusion of torts
has also been questioned. See Elphinstone, What is a Chose in Action?, 9 L.Q. REv.
311 (1893). But see Williams, Is a Right of Action in Tort a Chose in Action?, 10 L.Q.
REV. 143 (1894).
28 Maintenance arises when a cause of action is transferred to promote unneces-
sary litigation. The vice, which will render the contract void, is "the tendency or
purpose to stir up and foment litigation, multiply contentions, or unsettle the peace
and quiet of a community, or set one neighbor against another, or give one litigant
advantage over another." Fordson Coal Co. v. Garrard, 125 S.W.2d 977, 981 (Ky. 1939).
,1 See J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 211-12 (1913) [hereinafter cited as
AMES]; 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.2 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE]; 3 HOLDSWORTH 332.
18 It is interesting and instructive to compare the developments relating to the
assignment of rights ex delicto with the assignment of rights ex contractu. The latter
set of developments are discussed at notes 27-35 and accompanying text infra.
11 See generally 3 HoLDswoRTH 584-850. That such causes of action descended to
one's personal representative has been stated to be "hardly a departure from the rule
[of nonassignability], since the representative was looked upon as a continuation of
the person of the deceased." AMES at 210. However, other commentators have seen an
analytic relationship between the questions of survival and assignment. See notes 20,
22 and accompanying text infra.
2'0 Although actions ex contractu are also personal, they were largely unaffected
by this principle and generally survived. See 3 HOLDSWORTH 577-78.
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signability, 21 particularly if a personal representative's title to
a chose in action is deemed to have been obtained through
assignment,2 2 the common laW refusal to permit survival of tort
actions was a function of a number of factors distinct from
those underlying the general nonassignability rule.23 The most
important of these other factors was the concept that one pur-
pose of an action for damages was to obtain revenge for the
injury, which, of course, was futile once the victim was de-
ceased. 24 The recital to the initial 1330 enactment indicates
that its draftsmen viewed an action for trespass as punitive in
character.5 Although the statute expressly provided only for
survival of actions in trespass, it was construed broadly by the
courts to permit survival of other forms of action for injuries
which had diminished the decedent's personal estate.
2
1
Aside from the statutory genesis, tort claims in England
had acquired a degree of assignability in the courts through the
doctrine of subrogation. However, before this erosion of the
nonassignability rule can be placed in its proper perspective,
it is necessary to review the English law concerning the assign-
ment of contractual choses in action. The evolution of English
law in this area has been the subject of considerable study, and
its general outlines are well known. 27 Initially, the chancellor
began to permit a debt assignee to bring a bill in equity in his
own name to recover from the debtor.2s In response to this
2, See 7 HoLDSWORTH 538-39 and note 19 supra.
22 This was apparently the situation. See Raymond v. Fitch, 150 Eng. Rep. 251,
254 (Ex. 1835).
See generally Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13
VAND. L. REV. 605, 606-09 (1960).
24 Id. at 608. This concept cut both ways. The English law also circumscribed the
actions which might be brought by a tort victim against the estate of a deceased
tortfeasor. See 3 HOLDSWORTH 578-79.
2 Whereas in Times past Executors have not had Actions for a Trespass
done to their testators, as of the Goods and Chattels of the same Testators
carried away in their Life, and so such Trespasses have hitherto remained
unpunished; it is enacted, That the Executors in such Cases shall have an
Action against the Trespassers, and recover their Damages in like Manner
as they, whose Executors they be, should have had if they were in Life.
4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330).
21 See 1 E. WILLIAMS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXECUTroRs AND ADMINISTRATORS
608-10 (11th ed. 1921).
1 See generally 1 GILMORE § 7.3; 7 HoLDswoRTH 534-37.
2 See Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARv. L. REv. 816, 821-22
(1916) [hereinafter cited as Cook].
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development and to commercial pressure, courts of law intro-
duced a procedure by which the assignor of a debt could em-
power the assignee to sue in the assignor's name as the assig-
nor's attorney-in-fact, it being agreed that the assignee would
keep all or part of any recovery.29 Under this approach the
nonassignability rule theoretically remained inviolate. When
this procedure was challenged on the ground of maintenance,"
the assignee could argue in defense that there was a common
moral or legal interest in himself and the assignor; this defense
was upheld in cases where the assignment had been in
satisfaction of preexisting indebtedness.3 While maintenance
was at first presumed by the English courts, this presumption
had been eliminated by the time Blackstone's Commentaries
3 2
were published during 1765-69.3 Of course, the chancellor re-
ceived fewer petitions once the law courts permitted the as-
signee of a contractual chose in action to sue in the name of his
assignor. However, equity could still be of aid when the legal
remedy proved inadequate.34 Despite these developments, an
assignee's rights, even when asserted in an action at law, con-
tinue to be termed "equitable.
'35
As noted above, the second instance in English law in
which tort claims assumed a degree of assignability prior to the
Comegys decision involved the doctrine of subrogation. The
doctrine, as applied in equity, allowed insurers who paid their
insured's property damage claims to recover on the insured's
cause of action. The doctrine was applied on behalf of marine
29 See 7 HoLswoRTH 534; Cook 322-23.
30 See note 16 supra.
31 See 7 HOLDSWORTH 535. See generally Winfield, Assignment of Choses in Action
in Relation to Maintenance and Champerty, 35 L.Q. REv. 143 (1919). One writer has
offered another explanation for the "satisfaction of a preexisting debt" requirement.
See Bailey, Assignment of Debts in England from the Twelfth to the Twentieth
Century, 48 L.Q. REv. 548, 552-553 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Bailey].
32 W. BLACKSTONE, COtmENTARms (Chitty ed. 1845). See id. at xii for reference to
the publication date of the earliest edition.
33 See 7 HoLswoRTH 536.
31 See id. at 535-36.
31 See Williston, The Word "Equitable" and its Application to the Assignment of
Choses in Action, 31 HARv. L. REV. 822, 824-25 (1918). The assignee continued to be
required to sue at law in the name of the assignor until the enactment of codes of
procedure requiring suit in the name of the real party in interest. See generally Clark
& Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALE L.J. 259, 263-66 (1925).
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insurers by the mid-18th century.36 In two early cases, decided
in 1782 and 1783, the law courts determined that a nonmarine
insurer which paid its insured's claim was entitled to sue on the
claim, but only in the insured's name, not in its own .3 Both
suits were for property damage sustained during the riots of
1780, and were brought pursuant to the Riot Act which made
certain residents collectively responsible for damage to prop-
erty located within their residential area caused by a rioting
mob.M The justices in both cases treated the act as substituting
the residents for the actual tortfeasors in an action for trespass.
In the first case, Mason v. Sainsbury,"5 the insurance com-
pany's suit in the name of its insured was sustained on the
ground that it was well understood that an insurer stands in the
place of its insured upon payment of a loss and can therefore
recover in the insured's name. The second case, London Assur-
ance Co. v. Sainsbury,0 decided by the same panel of justices
which decided Mason (including Lord Mansfield), is even more
instructive as to the manner in which subrogation was viewed
at law. The insured in London Assurance had previously sued
in tort and received a judgment only for the uninsured portion
of his loss, although the jury had been instructed to award
damages for the entire loss and to disregard the payment of
insurance. The insurance company then brought suit it its own
name for the amount paid under the policy. The four-member
court split on the question of whether the action could be so
maintained.
11 See Randal v. Cockran, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (Ch. 1748). In this case the insurer,
who had paid his insured for a vessel captured by the Spanish, argued that he was
entitled to part of the compensation awarded by an English commission for the loss.
The chancellor decreed the insured to be a constructive trustee of funds received from
the commission. Although the right to compensation in this case may not immediately
strike the modem legal mind as sounding in tort, a similar right may have been viewed
as a tort by Justice Story in Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828). See notes
61-91 and accompanying text infra. Justice Story viewed Randal as an application of
the marine insurance doctrine of abandonment. See text accompanying notes 77-80
infra.
31 See London Assurance Co. v. Sainsbury, 99 Eng. Rep. 636 (K.B. 1783); Mason
v. Sainsbury, 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (K.B. 1782).
1 See An Act for Preventing Tumults and Riotous Assemblies and for the More
Speedy and Effectual Punishing the Rioters, 1 Geo. 1, c. 5, § 6 (1714). See generally 2
L. RADZINCWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 164 (1956).
99 Eng. Rep. 538 (K.B. 1782).
, 99 Eng. Rep. 636 (K.B. 1783).
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Lord Mansfield, while expressing regret that his finding
would leave the loss on the insurer for "want of a remedy,"4'
nevertheless reasoned that the cause of action belonged to the
insured and was, therefore, under the general rule, nonassigna-
ble and maintainable only in the name of the insured:
I take it to be a maxim, that as against the person sued the
action cannot be transferred. As between the parties them-
selves, the law has long supported it for the benefit of com-
merce; but the assignee must sue in the name of the assignor;
by which the defense is not varied. [Tihe general rule of law
should prevail, that as against the person sued the right of
action cannot be transferred, nor the defense varied."
A second justice, the one who had given the instructions which
were ignored by the jury in Mason, reasoned in much the same
way. He voiced his fear that permitting the suit could lead to
a multiplicity of actions in situations where several insurance
companies insured the same property. 3 The two justices find-
ing for the insurance company deduced that it had been injured
in its own right when it became liable under the policy and was,
therefore, entitled to maintain an action in its own name."4
As a result of these two cases, the principle that the insurer
must sue in the name of the insured as the subrogee of a tort
claim became well-established in English law.45 However, per-
haps the most interesting aspect of these cases as a second
encroachment on the nonassignability rule is that neither the
arguments of counsel nor the opinions of the court referred to
the problem of maintenance. A plausible explanation is that at
the time these cases were decided the vice of maintenance was
11 Id. at 640. This was apparently based on the assumption that a second action
in the name of the insured was barred by the first action. Concerning whether this
would be the result even if the insurer could sue in its own name, see note 43 infra.
42 99 Eng. Rep. at 640.
"Id. at 639. This justice also suggested that the judgment in the action brought
by the insured would bar the insurer's action even if the insurer could sue in its own
name because the cause of action is the same regardless of whether it is sued upon by
the insured or the insurer. Id. at 638.
" 99 Eng. Rep. at 639-40.
" See, e.g., Yates v. Whyte, 132 Eng. Rep. 793 (C.P. 1838); Compania Colombiana
De Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co., [1965] 1 Q.B. 101 (1963); King v. Victo-
ria Ins. Co., [1896] A.C. 250; Simpson & Co. v. Thompson, 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877).
For further discussion relevant to the doctrine of subrogation in England, see notes 77-
80 and accompanying text infra.
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no longer presumed when assignees sued on contractual debts;
consequently, it would have been very difficult to establish
maintenance in a suit by a subrogee-insurer both because of the
contractual relationship with the insured and because of the
legitimate interests served by subrogation.46 This explanation
draws oblique support from Lord Mansfield's reference to com-
mercial expediency and derives direct support from an English
justice in a considerably more recent opinion:
Equity always, before 1873, compelled an assured to lend his
name to enforce his underwriter's right of subrogation against
a contract breaker or tortfeasor. [W]hy did equity act as
equity did act before 1873 in relation to the enforcement of
subrogation rights? I think the answer is because the enforce-
ment of such rights was never regarded as the enforcement
of a bare cause of action, but as the enforcement of a cause
of action legitimately supported by the underwriter's interest
in recouping himself in respect of the amount of the loss
which he has paid under the policy as a result of the acts,
neglects or defaults of the actual contract breaker or tortfea-
sor.47
In summary, the enactment of survival statutes and the
judicial doctrine of subrogation are the only instances in which
it can be argued that tort claims had acquired a degree of
assignability in England prior to the Comegys decision in
1828.11 However, a third inroad into the nonassignability rule
was developing and was soon to emerge full-flower in the law
of bankruptcy. This development has particular significance,
11 These interests include recoupment by the insurance company, assurance that
the tortfeasor will pay for all the wrong, and prevention of double recovery by the
insured.
11 Compania Columbiana De Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co., [1965] 1
Q.B. 101, 121 (1963). The significance of the year 1873 is that in that year law and
equity were merged, and the assignment of choses in action became a matter governed
partially by statute. See Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c.
66, § 25. Neither this act nor its successor, the Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 & 16
Geo. 5, c. 20, was intended to enlarge the class of choses in action which were assigna-
ble in equity prior to 1873. See generally 3 HALSBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND 667-69
(3rd ed. 1968).
11 There was some movement in English law prior to Comegys toward giving
certain causes of action relating to the recovery of personalty the attributes of assigna-
bility, but the question remained quite unsettled until the late 19th or early 20th
century. See 7 HoLDswoRTH 521-23, 532-34.
1975]
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for it is the only context in which English judges have ever
considered, and perhaps adopted, the survivability-
assignability equivalency.
In a line of cases beginning in the late 18th century, the
English courts considered whether the bankrupt's estate could
include certain rights of action of the bankrupt.4 Though the
vesting language of the bankruptcy acts was inclusive, the doc-
trine emerged during the 1830's and 1840's that while rights of
action for commission of a tort or for breach of contract which
directly injured the bankrupt's estate could pass to the trus-
tee,5 rights of action for personal or emotional injury to the
bankrupt could not pass to the trustee.5' A number of these
early cases discussed the analogy which could be drawn from
statutes and case law dealing with survival of contract and tort
causes of action.52 This analogy must have seemed particularly
apt because, as discussed above, the English courts considered
that the intent of the survival statutes was to provide compen-
sation for depletion of the decedent's estate.5 3 Survivability
thus became very important in determining whether a claim
was assignable in bankruptcy, and language in some of the
opinions suggests that survival was conclusive on the ques-
tion.54 But, unlike the early American cases which developed
"' See cases cited in notes 51-58 infra. For a discussion of the bankruptcy acts
considered in these cases, see 8 HOLDSWORTH 236-45; 11 HoLDSWORTH 446-47; 13
HOLDSWORTH 376-78.
50 See generally M. HUNTER & D. GRAHAM, WILLIAt'S LAW AND PRACTICE IN
BANKRuPrCY 319-22 (18th ed. 1968).
51 See, e.g., Beckham v. Drake, 9 Eng. Rep. 1213 (H.L. 1849); Rogers v. Spence,
8 Eng. Rep. 1586 (H.L. 1846); Brewer v. Dew, 152 Eng. Rep. 955 (Ex. 1843); Howard
v. Crowther, 151 Eng. Rep. 1179 (Ex. 1841); Hancock v. Caffyn, 131 Eng. Rep. 432
(C.P. 1832); Porter v. Vorley, 131 Eng. Rep. 549 (C.P. 1832); Wright v. Fairfield, 109
Eng. Rep. 1314, 1399 (K.B. 1831).
11 See Beckham v. Drake, 9 Eng. Rep. 1213, 1219 (H.L. 1849); Wright v. Fairfield,
109 Eng. Rep. 1314, 1316 (K.B. 1831); Hancock v. Caffyn, 131 Eng. Rep. 432, 435 (C.P.
1832).
11 See notes 19-26 and accompanying text supra. It had also been held that per-
sonal representatives could not sue on some contractual claims, such as a breach of
contract to marry, which could not be viewed as damaging the personal estate of the
decedent. See Chamberlain v. Williamson, 105 Eng. Rep. 433 (K.B. 1814).
11 The most authoritative analysis of the appropriateness of the equivalency is
Beckham v. Drake, 9 Eng. Rep. 1213 (H.L. 1849). Although Beckham concerns an
assignment of a contractual claim, it provides a lengthy statement and analysis of the
doctrine of assignability of contract and tort causes of action in bankruptcy as it
developed before 1850:
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It is not disputed that the rights of the assignee under the statute law are
not identical with, nor are they so extensive as those of an executor, who
stands in the place of his testator, and represents him as to all his personal
contracts, and is by law his assignee, and therefore may maintain any action
in his right which he himself might. That must be understood to mean any
action on a contract, for an executor never could sue for wrongs to his testa-
tor; "actio personalis moritur cum persona." And with respect to contracts
some exceptions have been introduced by modern decisions . . . and the
executor cannot sue upon contracts the breach of which is a mere personal
wrong. The executor takes all the other personal rights of a testator, as a
consequence of his representative character, whether they are available for
the payment of debts or not, for his liability to pay debts is the consequence,
not the object, of the appointment. The assignee is created by statute, for
the purpose of recovering and receiving the estate, and paying the debts of
the bankrupt, and takes only what the statute gives for that purpose. What
then does it give? It clearly gives . . . not merely all personal chattels,
securities for money, and debts properly so called, but all unexecuted con-
tracts which the assignee could perform, the performance of which would be
beneficial to the bankrupt's estate. These are "personal estate" [as that
expression is used in the bankruptcy statute].
• . . The words "personal estate" clearly comprise all chattels, chattel
interests, and all the subjects mentioned in the twelfth section; and they also
comprise some rights of action which are not properly debts, and would not
pass under the word "debts," but do pass under the description of "personal
estate."
For instance, some actions for torts do pass. Actions for injuries to per-
sonal chattels, whereby they are directly affected, and are prevented from
coming to the hands of the assignee, or come diminished in value, undoubt-
edly pass. The action of trover for a conversion before the bankruptcy is a
familiar instance of this.
On the other hand, rights of action for injuries to the person, or reputa-
tion, or the possession of real estate, do not pass . . ...
What then is the proper construction of this section of the act, according
to its words and the several cases decided upon it? The proper and reasona-
ble construction appears to me to be, that the statute transfers not all rights
of action which would pass to executors . . . but all such as would be assets
in their hands for the payment of debts, and no others-all which could be
turned to profit, for such rights of action are personal estate. Of such the
executor is assignee in law; and the nature of the office and duty of a bank-
rupt's assignee requires that he should have them also. But rights of action
for torts which would die with the testator, according to the rule, "actio
personalis moritur cum persona", and all actions of contract affecting the
person only, would not pass. Of such the executor is not assignee in law; and
whatever may be the reason of the law which prohibits him from being so,
seems equally to apply to a bankrupt's assignee.
Id. at 1229-31. The opinion of Justice V. Williams also contains an analysis of this
analogy. See id. at 1219.
The opinion of Judge Littledale in Wright v. Fairfield, 109 Eng. Rep. 1314 (K.B.
1831), another contract assignment case, also considers the matter of survivability:
I am of opinion that the Legislature in this statute intended to give assignees
all the remedies in respect of the property which they were entitled to under
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and utilized the survivability-assignability equivalency, the
English courts were meticulous in articulating the similarities
between a personal representative and a bankruptcy trustee.55
This is probably the reason why survival has not been persu-
asive in England in other situations, where the fear of mainte-
nance continues to be the predominant factor prohibiting as-
signability. 56 Maintenance was not a material factor in these
early English bankruptcy cases, apparently because the cause
of action was assignable under a statute and because of the
important public policies embodied in the bankruptcy acts.'
Although the survivability of tort claims in England did
not become a factor in bankruptcy until after Comegys, the
beginnings of the equivalency in bankruptcy arose before
Comegys in nontort contexts." But even though several early
the former Acts, and that they should have power (as it appears to me that
they had under those statutes) to sue upon contracts made with the bank-
rupt, and for injuries affecting his property, though not for mere personal
wrongs, and such causes of action as would abate by his death.
Id. at 1316.
Hancock v. Caffyn, 131 Eng. Rep. 432 (C.P. 1832), a case involving a tort cause
of action, also discussed survivability:
Undoubtedly, there is a large class of actions, in which, though an action lies
for the bankrupt, the right does not pass to his assignees; as for injuries to
person or reputation: but we should not give due effect to the statute, if we
were to hold that a right did not pass arising out of an injury which has
lessened the amount of the fund belonging to the creditors . . . .When the
statute directs an assignment of all the bankrupt's present personal estate,
how can we except a right in respect of which the fund accruing to the
creditors would receive compensation to the extent to which the property of
the bankrupt had been diminished. The case of executors affords a close
analogy: they cannot sue for any injury to the person of the testator; but in
respect of an injury to the property which would have formed part of the
assets, they are entitled to recover.
Id. at 435.
"5 See note 54 supra.
5 See note 59 infra.
It is interesting to note, however, that something like the flavor of the fear of
maintenance can be found in discussions of the nonassignability of causes of action
which did not result from a tort which diminished the bankrupt's estate. See, e.g.,
Howard v. Crowther, 151 Eng. Rep. 1179 (Ex. 1841) (cause of action for seduction of a
servant): "Assignees of a bankrupt are not to make a profit of a man's wounded
feelings; causes of action, therefore, which are, as in this case, purely personal, do not
pass to the assignees . . . ... Id. at 1180.
11 In 1794 a divided English court in Brandon v. Pate, 126 Eng. Rep. 566 (C.P.
1794), held that the assignee of a bankrupt may recover money gambled away by the
bankrupt in an action of debt provided by a statute which was enacted "for the better
TORT CLAIMS AS INTANGIBLE PROPERTY
American cases, including Comegys, involved assignments in
bankruptcy, none expressly relied on these English cases.
Thus, the significance of the English bankruptcy cases is not
that they provide a non-American origin for the survivability-
assignability equivalency, but rather that they represent a rea-
soned approach to special tort claim assignments which the
English did not later extend to the assignment of all tort
claims. 9 The logic of such a restriction may be tested by an
analysis of the American experience with the equivalency in
particular and tort claim assignability in general."
preventing of excessive and deceitful Gaming." 9 Anne c. 14 (1710). The problem of
maintenance was ignored and the analogy with the question of survival of actions was
considered:
An Executor clearly could not bring the action, which by the statute is
limited to the loser himself, within the three months. But the assignees of a
bankrupt are different from other representatives; for if the party himself
were to recover the money, he must pay it over to the assignees. It is to be
considered as part of the bankrupt's estate, which was wrongfully passed to
the winner; and if so, the assignees have a right to it, and ought in reason to
sue for it.
Id. at 568. A case decided the next year unanimously held that a right of action to
recover real property could be assigned to a bankrupt's assignees as an exception to
the general rule of nonassignability of rights of actions by virtue of the policy of
bankrupt laws. See Smith v. Coffin, 126 Eng. Rep. 641 (C.P. 1795):
It is true that on general principles rights of action are not forfeitable, nor
assignable, except in a particular mode; but that rule is founded on the
policy of the common law, which is averse to encourage litigation; but in this
case the policy of the bankrupt laws requires that the right of action should
be assignable and transferred to the assignees as much as any other species
of property. It is an hereditament, and the words of the several statutes are
large enough to comprehend it, and no case has been shown to prove that it
ought not to pass. What then does the whole argument amount to but this,
that in many cases, from the policy of the law, a right of action does not pass?
But here the policy is, that every right belonging in any shape to the
bankrupt, should pass to his assignees ....
Id. at 650. In a third case, there is dicta to the effect that the assignee could receive a
bankrupt's rights of action sounding in trover and assumpsit. See Clark v. Calvert, 129
Eng. Rep. 573, 576 (C.P. 1819).
11 The instances of survival of tort claims, subrogation, and assignment to bank-
ruptcy assignees today remain important exceptions to a general English rule of nonas-
signability which is still based on the prohibition against maintenance. R. HEUSTON,
SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 221 (15th ed. 1969). Important additional exceptions
have been added. For example, there is authority for the proposition that property may
be transferred even though subject to litigation and unrecoverable without a tort
action. Also, damages to be recovered in the future in a tort action may be assigned
although the claim itself cannot. Id.
11 As the focus shifts to this American approach, it may be helpful to keep in mind
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B. Comegys v. Vasse as the Source of the Equivalency in
America
An analysis of the American experience must begin with
Comegys v. Vasse,61 a case which triggered the acceptance of
the survivability-assignability equivalency in America, and
one which could have provided an excellent vehicle for a com-
prehensive analysis of tort claim assignability because it in-
volved two separate assignments of what was arguably a tort
claim. Vasse was an underwriter of marine insurance who, prior
to 1802, had accepted the abandonments" and paid the losses
of United States citizens whose vessels and cargoes had been
captured and condemned during the French and Spanish spo-
liation of American shipping which followed the signing of
Jay's Treaty with Great Britain in 1794.63 In 1802 Vasse's credi-
tors forced him into a federal bankruptcy proceeding64 and cer-
tain of Vasse's assets were assigned to the bankruptcy trustees.
Vasse was ultimately discharged from his debts in that same
year. In 1824 the trustees received a sum of money, pursuant
to a treaty, in satisfaction of claims arising out of Spain's role
in the Franco-Hispanic interferences with American com-
merce." Vasse sued in assumpsit to recover this payment, thus
raising the questions of whether the insured's claim against
the comments of a writer whose subject matter was the alienability of contractual
choses in action:
We have now reached the time when America separated from the mother
country and we must therefore transfer our attention from English, to Ameri-
can cases, for in this, as in so many other branches of our law, the so-called
"common law" is received not as a completed system but as a growing
organism whose further development under new and different surroundings
is not necessarily the same as in the old home.
Cook, supra note 28, at 826.
61 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828).
62 The doctrine of abandonment is discussed infra at notes 77-80 and accompany-
ing text.
See generally S. MORRISON & H. COMMAGER, THE GRoWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 358-59 (5th ed. 1962). Concerning the Spanish participation in these adven-
tures, see generally H. FULLER, THE PURCHASE OF FLORIDA 95-96 (1906).
11 This was under the short-lived Bankruptcy Act of 1800 which was repealed in
1803. See Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19; Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat.
248. The next federal bankruptcy legislation was not enacted until 1841. See Act of
Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440.
65 8 Stat. 252 (1819). This treaty is notable primarily because it ceded Florida to
the United States. See generally H. FULLER, THE PURCHASE OF FLORIDA 307 (1906).
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Spain had passed to Vasse through the insured's abandonment
or Vasse's payment of the claim; and, if so, whether this claim
had then been transferred to the bankruptcy trustees. The Fed-
eral Circuit Court of Pennsylvania, which first heard the case,
answered only the second question. It held that the claim,
which it characterized as "an expectancy without hope," 6 was
not the type of asset assignable by the terms of the bankruptcy
statute." This result left Vasse entitled to the fund without any
analysis of how the claim came to be vested in Vasse in the first
place.6"
Predictably, in their arguments to the United States Su-
preme Court the litigants devoted considerable time and effort
to describing the claim and its assignability. Justice Story,
however, deemed a detailed discussion of the authorities un-
necessary. In holding for the trustees, he stated a rule which
has had a significant impact in shaping the law of tort claim
assignments in the United States:
In general, it may be affirmed, that mere personal torts,
which die with the party, and do not survive to his personal
representative, are not capable of passing by assignment; and
that vested rights ad rem and in re, possibilities coupled with
an interest, and claims growing out of, and adhering to prop-
erty, may pass by assignment.69
The general rule stated in Comegys can be dissected into
two components: a negative statement of the survivability-
assignability equivalency, and an affirmative declaration that
"vested rights," "possibilities coupled with an interest," and
property "claims" are assignable. The import of the negative
statement is clear. The notion that surviving torts are assigna-
ble did not originate with Justice Story but can be traced to a
series of four earlier Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases which
were relied on by counsel in their arguments before the
Comegys Court.7" Three of these cases decided which tort
11 Vasse v. Comegys, 28 F. Cas. 1101, 1105 (No. 16893) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825).
17 Id. See also Vasse v. Mifflin, 28 F. Cas. 1106 (No. 16895) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825).
1- Vasse v. Comegys, 28 F. Cas. 1101, 1105 (No. 16893) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825).
cl 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 213.
,0 Id. at 198, 209. The cases were O'Donnel v. Seybert, 13 S. & R. 53 (Pa. 1825);
North v. Turner, 9 S. & R. 243 (Pa. 1823); Sommer v. Wilt, 4 S. & R. 18 (Pa. 1818);
Shoemaker v. Keely, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793). The equating of assignability with
survivability originated in these cases which are discussed in notes 71-75 and accompa-
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claims of an insolvent debtor passed to a trustee under Penn-
sylvania bankruptcy legislation.7 1 These opinions reveal, at
least, a noncritical application of the same analogy with surviv-
ability which English Judges found so attractive in construing
English bankruptcy legislation, and represent, at most, an out-
right adoption of the survivability-assignability equivalency as
conclusive on the question of tort claim assignability. 2 That a
complete adoption of the equivalency was contemplated is evi-
nying text infra. Another opinion cited by counsel in Comegys in connection with tort
claim assignability was Bird v. Hempstead, 3 Day 272 (Conn. 1808), which held that
a right of action founded on tort was not assignable under the Federal Bankruptcy Act
of 1800 because it did not fall within the statutory description of assignable assets.
Other cited cases dealt with the assignment of a tort claim in the context of an
abandonment under a marine insurance policy, and are discussed at notes 77-80 and
accompanying text infra. Three other pre-Comegys American cases which discuss tort
claim assignability are: Young v. Ferguson, 11 Ky. (2 Litt.) 298 (1822); Stogdel v.
Fugate, 9 Ky. (2 Marsh.) 136 (1819) (both holding that a claim of trover is nonassigna-
ble); Stanly v. Duhurst, 2 Root 52 (Conn. 1793) (holding that an action for malicious
abuse of process is not assignable under an insolvency act).
7 State insolvency legislation was undoubtedly more important during this period
than it is today because of the nearly total absence of federal legislation addressing
the problem. See note 64 supra.
2 See notes 49-57 and accompanying text supra. The first of these cases held in
1793 that an assignment in bankruptcy does not pass a cause of action for deceit, which
remains the "mere personal concern of the bankrupt," because under the bankruptcy
statute only debts were assignable. Shoemaker v. Keely, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793). The
court avoided dealing directly with the assignee's argument that his suit should be
sustained on the same principle that permitted an action to be brought by executors
or administrators who are assignees of the deceased. The court could have again
avoided the formulation of a general rule of tort claim assignability when, in 1818, an
insolvent attempted to maintain an action for malicious abuse of process after he had
filed his petition for relief under the Pennsylvania insolvent debtor's act. See Sommer
v. Wilt, 4 S. & R. 18 (Pa. 1818). The defendant objected that the claim had passed to
the assignee, but the court again held that a personal tort was not assignable under
the language of that enactment, and that its earlier decision in Shoemaker was "con-
clusive." However, the court gratuitously added that the action was a "personal action
which would die with [the insolvent's] person," and, putting the cart before the horse,
"[i]f it passed by the assignment, and vested in the assignees, his death could not
effect it." Id. at 28. The third of the Pennsylvania decisions, decided in 1825, consid-
ered whether an insolvent could maintain an action on the case arising out of an
excessive distress for rent, after he had petitioned for relief under the state's insolvency
laws. See O'Donnel v. Seybert, 13 S. & R. 53 (Pa. 1825). The court, ignoring the
language of the insolvency act, stated that the claim could not be assigned "moritur
cum persona: but it is likewise, an action on a penal statute, which does not survive."
Id. at 56. That assignability of surviving claims became the law in Pennsylvania is
demonstrated by the one noninsolvency case discussed in notes 73-75 and accompany-
ing text infra.
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denced by the one noninsolvency case, North v. Turner.7 3 In
that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to de-
cide whether a claim for trespass debonis asportatis could be
assigned for the purpose of avoiding the competency rule
which excluded the testimony of a party to the suit. 4 Holding
that the claim could be so assigned, the court noted that the
tort in question survived to the personal representative under
Pennsylvania law, and that this "clearly shows that such a
cause of action is separable from the person of the owner
'75
The origin and meaning of the affirmative portion of the
Comegys rule is more difficult to discern, but it appears to
reflect several strands of legal doctrine which had some influ-
ence on the Court.
First, it seems quite likely that the affirmative segment is
in part merely an elaboration of the thought expressed in the
negative statement. That is, after stating that torts which do
not survive are not assignable, Justice Story then described
certain claims which had been held to survive and hence would
be assignable under the equivalency. The language in the af-
firmative statement could, for example, comprehend the action
,3 9 S. & R. 243 (Pa. 1823).
"1 The court in North noted that such an assignment had been previously held to
be effective in Pennsylvania for that purpose, but in connection with a nontort claim.
See 9 S. & R. at 248. The competency rule, now discarded, was once accepted as
axiomatic:
Total exclusion from the stand is the proper safeguard against a false deci-
sion, whenever the persons offered are of a class specially likely to speak
falsely; Persons having a pecuniary interest in the event of the cause are
specially likely to speak falsely; Therefore such persons should be totally
excluded.
2 J. WIGMORE, EVmENCE § 576, at 686 (1940). "The notion of interest at common law
applied of course to the parties to the suit, for their interest in the event of the litigation
was obviously the most marked." Id. § 577, at 693.
Is 9 S. & R. at 248. This tort claim survived by virtue of the English survival
statute, 4 Edw. 111, c. 7 (1330), which apparently became a part of the law of Pennsyl-
vania through the operation of that state's reception statute. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
46, 88 152-53 (1969) (repealed, Dec. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 290 § 4). This survival statute,
enacted in 1330, is discussed at note 19 and accompanying text supra. Interestingly,
the court suggested in dictum that an insolvent's action could pass to an assignee in
bankruptcy because the assignee could obtain title to the personalty upon which the
trespass was committed. 9 S. & R. at 248. This sort of uncertainty concerning the exact
rationale for assignability or nonassignability can be found in some of the other Penn-
sylvania cases and in Comegys.
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of detinue brought to recover personalty in specie or the action
of trover for conversion of personalty, both of which had been
previously held to survive.
76
Secondly, Justice Story definitely had in mind the marine
insurance concept of abandonment when he wrote the affirma-
tive portion of the general rule, as evidenced by his analysis of
authorities utilizing this doctrine. An abandonment occurs
when an insured under a marine insurance policy relinquishes
all of his rights in the insured property in order to turn a partial
loss into a total recovery. Acceptance of an abandonment enti-
tles the insurance company to the insured's ownership rights.
77
However, the insurer is not entitled to assert the insured's
rights against tortfeasors until it pays the insured's claim.7"
The rights upon payment are realized by the insurer through
subrogation.79 However, Comegys was decided before this dis-
tinction had developed. 0
11 For actions of detinue, see LeMason v. Dixon, 82 Eng. Rep. 92 (K.B. 1620). See
also the discussion of LeMason in the note to Wheatly v. Lane, 85 Eng. Rep. 228, 229
(K.B. 1669). Detinue was viewed as partly delictual. See 7 HOLDSwORTH 437-40. As for
trover for conversion of personalty, see Rutland v. Rutland, 78 Eng. Rep. 624 (K.B.
1595). Trover was clearly delictual. See 7 HOLDSWORTH 440.
11 See generally W. VANCE & B. ANDERSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE §
177 (3rd ed. 1951); 6 J. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE chs.
160-61 (1972) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN].
' See L. BuGLAss, MARINE INSURANCE CLAIMs: AMF IcAN LAW AND PRACTICE 84-85
(1972); 6A APPLEMAN § 4121.
79 Id.
1 Discussions of the development of the distinction between the rights which an
insurer realizes by accepting an abandonment and the rights realized upon payment
of the insured's claim through subrogation can be found in Note, Subrogation of the
Insurer to Collateral Rights of the Insured, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 202, 208, n.44 (1928) and
Note, Abandonment and Subrogation in Marine Insurance, 18 HARv. L. REv. 383
(1905). Three of the cases which Justice Story discussed were products of the era during
which the distinction between abandonment and subrogation was not clear. The cases
were: Gracie v. New York Ins. Co., 8 N.Y.C.L. (8 John.) 179 (1811); Watson v. Insur-
ance Co. of North America, 1 Binn. 46 (Pa. 1803); and Randal v. Cockran, 27 Eng.
Rep. 916 (Ch. 1748). The latter, which was the most influential of the three, is unclear
as to whether it was decided on the basis of abandonment or on the doctrine of
subrogation. However, it has been treated in England as being an application of the
subrogation doctrine which is now clearly differentiated from the doctrine of abandon-
ment in that country. See Compania Columbiana de Seguros v. Pacific Steam Naviga-
tion Co., [1965] 1 Q.B. 101, 111-22 (1963); 22 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 161, 162
n.9 (3rd ed. 1958). This is the better interpretation of Randal since the event which
fixed the insurer's rights to compensation from a third party was satisfaction of the
insured's claim. 27 Eng. Rep. at 916.
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Finally, the affirmative portion of the Comegys rule re-
flects a series of American and English cases which recognized
the right of a vendee of property with disputed title to assert
the vendor's right of action to remove the cloud on the title.
The vendee-assignee's interest in the property was sufficient to
prevent the purchase agreements from being invalid on the
grounds of maintenance or champerty,1 provided that the pur-
chaser did not agree to pay costs or make advances beyond
those necessary to support that portion of the litigation which
involved his interest. Justice Story discussed these cases ap-
provingly in his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,82 pub-
lished in 1836, eight years after Comegys. While none of the
title cases decided prior to Comegys involved a tort cause of
action or a transfer of personal property, they are nevertheless
analogous to the situation in which an insured transfers both
his rights in the insured property and his claims against third
persons resulting from an invasion of that property. There
would be a chance that the insurer might recover the property,
which would constitute one of the "possibilities coupled with
an interest" in the general rule. The resulting claim against
third parties would be "growing out of, and adhering" to the
property rights which had been transferred to the insurer."3
Of the various doctrines available to Justice Story, which
was employed in finding for the bankruptcy trustees? It was
not the survivability-assignability equivalency. Comegys
turned on abandonment and possibly on the notion that the
right to compensation was transferable because it was appur-
tenant to the property rights passing to the assignees. This is
apparent for several reasons. Justice Story himself character-
ized the issue before the Court as one that "turns upon the
11 "Champerty" is defined as "a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by
which such third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk
in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds of subject sought to
be recovered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (4th ed. 1968). For a definition of mainte-
nance, see note 16 supra.
82 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1050-53 (13th ed. 1886).
' English law did take a few tentative steps toward validating the assignment of
property-related tort claims prior to the decision in Comegys, but these developments,
which were not discussed by Justice Story in his treatise on equity jurisprudence, were
equivocal, and the law did not clearly move in this direction until after Comegys. See
note 48 supra.
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nature and effect of an abandonment, for a total loss to the
underwriters," and after reviewing authorities dealing with this
doctrine, he concluded "that the assignment by abandonment
is competent not only to pass the property itself, . . . but also
any compensation awarded by way of indemnity therefore."84
The opinion does not mention any survival statute or judicial
construction thereof. Justice Story concluded that there was a
right to compensation which arose upon the illegal capture of
the vessels and cargoes, but he did not characterize the right
as a tort claim.8 Although stated initially in the general rule,
the equivalency resurfaced only once after Justice Story found
the debtor's right to be assignable." When faced with whether
the right to compensation fell within the meaning of the bank-
ruptcy act as assignable property, the Justice reasoned that the
terms of the act were "broad enough to cover every description
of vested right and interest attached to and growing out of
property. '8 7 Then, in apparent reference to the equivalency,
Justice Story assumed without analysis that the claim would
survive, asking rhetorically: "[W]hy then should it not be
assets in the hands of the assignees?" 8 Finally, when Justice
Story published his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence,9
he stated flatly, with no mention of the equivalency, that a
mere right of action in tort is not assignable on public policy
grounds because such an assignment would have the unsavory
character of maintenance.
' 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 214.
Id. at 216.
86 Justice Story stated:
We consider it, then, clear, upon authority, that the right to the compensa-
tion in this case, was in its nature assignable, and passed by abandonment
to Vasse; and upon principle, we should arrive at the same conclusion. The
right to indemnity for an unjust capture, whether against the captors or the
sovereign, whether remediable in his own Courts, or by his own extraordinary
interposition and grants upon public negotiation, is a right attached to the
ownership of the property itself . . . . If so assignable to Vasse, it was
equally, in its own nature, capable of assignment to others; and the only
remaining inquiry would be, whether it had so passed by assignment from
him.
Id. at 215.
87 Id. at 218.
" Id.
"1 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENcE (13th ed. 1886).
90 Id. § 1040g.
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The issues of assignability raised in Comegys confronted
Justice Story with a difficult legal problem in which little was
clear except that, in fairness, the trustees should prevail. The
survivability-assignability equivalency would probably have
received broad acceptance without the impetus provided by
Comegys, l but Comegys stands as the root of the doctrine in
America. Although the source can be located with no greater
certainty than this, there is no room to doubt the broad accept-
ance which the equivalency has since enjoyed in American
courts.
C. American Acceptance and Application of the Equivalency
Indicative of the prominence of the equivalency in Ameri-
can law is the fact that by 1916 the editors of a legal encyclope-
dia could state, with footnotes brimming, that the general com-
mon law rule in the United States was that the test of whether
a tort cause of action was assignable depended on its surviva-
bility.92 Pomeroy, in his treatise on equity jurisprudence,9 3 de-
scribed torts which survived, and were thus assignable, as gen-
erally including those causing injury to real and personal prop-
erty, and those arising from fraud, deceit, or other wrongs
which damage an estate, real or personal. Among those not
surviving, and thus not assignable, were torts to the person or
character, where the injury was limited to the body or feel-
ings. 4 Pomeroy broadly concluded that survivability was used
to determine the assignability of all choses in action, including
rights under contracts.95
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the later American
cases adopting the equivalency is not what was said, but in-
stead what was left unsaid. First, virtually all have assumed
that assignability flows naturally from survivability just as
night inevitably follows day. It troubled few courts that the
11 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Gavit, 18 Conn. 522 (1847); People ex rel. Stanton v.
Tioga, 29 N.Y.C.L. (19 Wend.) 42 (1837).
See 5 C.J. Assignments § 52 (1916).
j. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3rd ed. 1905).
" Id. § 1275. See generally 3 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 86-
88 (1906).
15 Concerning the use of the survival test to determine assignability of rights ex
contractu, see generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 547(d) (1932).
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transfer to a decedent's personal representative could hardly be
considered a voluntary or consensual assignment even if one is
willing to assume that a personal representative is a type of
assignee. 6 Presumably, the decedent-assignor would have pre-
ferred to retain his cause of action until "kingdom come"
rather than "assign" it by dying. Furthermore, a decedent's
"assignee" could hardly be deemed an intermeddler in a law
suit, and his duties as a fiduciary would help to insure that any
suit would be conducted for the benefit of the estate and not
for the purpose of harassing or oppressing the tortfeasor. In
comparison, an inter vivos assignment is voluntary and, al-
though the assignment is made with the knowledge and con-
sent of the assignor, the assignee would more readily appear to
be an intermeddler who might be motivated to harass or op-
press and who would not be subject to the duties of a fiduciary.
Second, although America's broad application of the equiva-
lency was a significant departure from its narrow usage in
England, the extent of this departure was rarely recognized by
American courts. Third, although American courts would
occasionally refer to the English fear of maintenance to sup-
port their proscription of the assignment of personal tort
claims, rarely was an attempt made to explain why mainte-
nance was no longer a concern in the assignment of property
tort claims. Nor was it explained what distinguished personal
from property tort claims except to ritualistically state that
the former did not survive while the latter did.
These observations of judicial silence are not offered as
absolutes because there were notable exceptions. In 1855, Jus-
tice Augustus C. Hand, dissenting in McKee v. Judd," both
recognized and questioned the American departure from
British doctrine:
I had supposed that a mere right of action for tort could not
be assigned, either at law or in equity, except by means of
some statutory proceedings . . . . A cause of action arising
from a tortious act will sometimes pass to the assignees of an
insolvent, or to the assignees in bankruptcy. In those cases,
11 See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra, and note 97 and accompanying
text infra.
97 12 N.Y. 622 (1855).
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there can be no objection on the ground of champerty and
maintenance; and the criterion is whether the action is to
recover damages for an injury to the property of the insolvent
or bankrupt, or for a wrong personal to him. A solatium for
an injury done to the person or personal feelings of the debtor
cannot be assigned. But if the substantial cause of action
arises from an act that diminishes or impairs his property, it
passes to the assignees . . . The transfer in such cases is in
compliance with a statute, and is generally in invitum. But
where the act is done on the mere motion of the parties, the
assignment of a bare right to bring an action for a mere tort
has been considered void on the ground of public policy.
There is nothing in the [New York Civil Code] which abro-
gates this salutary principle; indeed the question is one of
right or title and not of remedy.98
Moreover, in 1861 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts made a number of observations concerning the matter
of tort claim assignability. In Rice v. Stone,99 the court held
that a personal injury action could not be assigned before final
judgment, even though this type of claim survived by a newly
enacted statute in that jurisdiction. The opinion is revealing
because it presents several of the justifications occasionally
offered to support the equivalency, thereby suggesting the ex-
istence of some fallacies which undermine those justifications.
The court first recognized that the old common law prohibition
against maintenance has lost most of its force in America, but
then allowed, without citing any authority, that it enjoyed a
glimmer of life in connection with the proscription against per-
sonal tort assignments because "there are no counter balancing
reasons in favor of such purchases [of personal tort claims],
growing out of convenience of business . . . ."I" The validity
of this assumption is called into question by the facts of Rice,
where the tort assignment in question was made to secure a
preexisting debt (although the opinion is not clear as to the
commercial or personal nature of the debt).
The court next suggested that the rationale underlying the
nonassignability of personal tort causes of action was grounded
' Id. at 627.
83 Mass. (1 Allen) 566 (1861).
'o Id. at 569.
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in the basic supposition that "[a] man cannot grant or change
that which he has not,"'' and that the holder of a personal tort
claim has nothing to transfer prior to settlement or judgment
because it "has no value that can be so estimated as to form a
proper consideration for a sale."" 2 The Rice court attempted to
support this conclusion by distinguishing property-related
torts from personal torts in that the value of the loss in the
former can be objectively ascertained, the loss being measured
by diminution in value, 0 3 whereas the value of the loss in the
latter is less capable of being objectively determined. The va-
lidity of this distinction is debatable because "difficult" is not
synonymous with "impossible," and the mere fact that a value
may have to be determined through some conjecture, without
agreement of the interested parties, does not in other circum-
stances stop courts and juries from setting values on injuries to
property.
The court should have stopped on the shaky ground of its
first two justifications, but instead it raised yet another argu-
ment which had occasionally surfaced to support the equiva-
lency: "[T]he considerations which are urged to a jury in be-
half of one whose reputation or domestic peace has been de-
stroyed, whose feelings have been outraged, or who has suffered
bodily pain and danger, are of a nature so strictly personal,
that an assignee cannot urge them with any force."'' 4 While the
nonavailability of the tort victim to testify might arguably jus-
tify denying the survival of personal torts, the argument loses
strength when an inter vivos assignment is involved because
the victim is available to testify and may be quite able and
willing to do so vigorously, particularly if he has retained some
interest in the recovery. °5 Indeed, as noted earlier, one of the
earliest American cases to apply the equivalency did so solely
to enable the tort victim-assignor to testify.'0 '
l Id.
10 Id. at 570.
'3 Id. at 569-70.
104 Id.
,05 One example of this sort of situation would be where the tort victim has as-
signed part of any future recovery on his cause of action to an assignee while retaining
the balance for himself. Concerning partial assignments, see generally 1 GnMoER. 207-
08. Concerning the assignment of the future proceeds of an existing tort cause of action,
see pt. III infra.
10 See the discussion of North v. Turner at notes 73-75 and accompanying text
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One final interesting aspect of Rice is its use of the distinc-
tion between an inter vivos voluntary assignment and an invol-
untary assignment to a decedent's "assignee." As indicated
above, the distinctions which might be drawn between the two
situations had not prevented American courts from broadly
adopting and applying the equivalency to property-related
torts. Nevertheless, the Rice court relied on the distinction to
disallow the voluntary assignment of a personal tort claim:
There cannot be the same objection to the transmission of
such a claim to executors and administrators as to its assign-
ment to strangers; and by our recent legislation actions for
damage to the person survive; but we do not consider this as
materially affecting the question whether such rights of ac-
tions may be assigned to a stranger.0 7
Analyses such as those found in McKee and Rice were
atypical. The overwhelming majority of courts which adopted
or applied the equivalency treated it as a convenient rule of
thumb to be applied without question. The lack of concern for
the problem of maintenance in assignments of property-related
torts can be traced to a pervasive, yet generally unarticulated,
judicial feeling that the conditions precipitating the develop-
ment and existence of the prohibition against maintenance in
England simply did not exist in America. ' This attitude, plus
the need to permit the assignment of tort causes of action in
bankruptcy and in commercial settings, probably account for
the broad and rapid acceptance of the equivalency doctrine in
the United States.' 9 The courts' apparent perception of the
"rightness" of the ultimate conclusion that personal torts were
not assignable may be attributable to a deeply felt, if not en-
tirely logical, belief that such causes of action should not be a
commodity for sale.110
supra. However, North also stated in dictum that personal torts would not be assigna-
ble. See 9 S. & R. at 248-49.
' 83 Mass. (1 Allen) at 571.
IC An early opinion in which this view is ably expressed is Thallhimer v. Brincker-
hoff, 3 Cowen 623 (N.Y. Ct. of Errors 1824). See generally Brooks, Champerty and
Maintenance in the United States, 3 VA. L. REv. 421-22 (1916).
'" Some commercial situations in which tort causes of action have been assigned
are discussed at notes 131-41 and accompanying text infra.
,10 See North Chicago State Ry. v. Ackely, 49 N.E. 222, 225 (Ill. 1897). The court
in rationalizing its holding said that even if a personal action survives, it cannot be
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Turning to the present, the survivability-assignability
equivalency continues as the common denominator for the law
of tort claim transferability in the United States. Courts con-
tinue to apply it without question."' Some differentiate be-
tween personal and property-related torts, but the equivalency
is the source of this distinction.' The equivalency also helps
explain the statutes enacted to meet the problem of tort claim
assignability. For example, New York's statute provides that
any claim or demand is transferable except "where it is to
recover damages for a personal injury,""' 3 and "personal in-
jury" is defined to include libel, slander and malicious prosecu-
tion, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other actionable
injury to the person."4 Similarly, California's act provides that
"a thing in action, arising out of the violation of a right of
property . . . may be transferred by the owner.
'""15
assigned inter vivos on the grounds that the purpose of the survival statute was to
benefit the widow and next of kin of the decedent, and actions under it could be
brought only for their benefit. Presumably all survival legislation has as an important
purpose the aiding of beneficiaries of the decedent's estate, but research has disclosed
no case in which this has been raised as an objection to the assignability of property-
related torts. Some courts have permitted the assignment of personal injury actions
once they have been made to survive by the legislature. See note 127 and accompany-
ing text infra.
"' See, e.g., Selfridge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 219 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969);
Nichols v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 155 N.W.2d 104 (Wis. 1967).
"I See, e.g., Demmery v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 232 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1961). See generally Note, Assignment of Tort Claims in Pennsylvania, 15 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 123 (1953).
"I The full statute provides:
Any claim or demand can be transferred, except in one of the following cases:
1. Where it is to recover damages for a personal injury;
2. Where it is founded upon a grant, which is made void by a statute of the
state; or upon a claim to or interest in real property, a grant of which, by
the transferrer, would be void by such a statute;
3. Where a transfer thereof is expressly forbidden by a statute
of the state, or the United States, or would contravene public policy.
N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAW § 13-101 (McKinney 1961).
"I N.Y. GEN. CONST. LAW § 37-a (McKinney 1951). The New York courts initially
applied the equivalency to decide questions of tort claim assignability. See, e.g., Peo-
ple ex rel. Stanton v. Tioga, 29 N.Y.C.L. (19 Wend.) 42 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1837). Some
New York courts continued to consider the equivalency after tort claim assignments
became a statutory matter. See, e.g., Walker v. Sanford, 214 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup. Ct.)
aff'd mem., 216 N.Y.S. 932, (App. Div. 1926). But see Keeler v. Dunham, 99 N.Y.S.
669, 671 (App. Div. 1906).
"I The full statute provides: "A thing in action, arising out of the violation of a
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Of course, if the law is uncertain in its determinations of
which tort causes of action survive, it will likewise be uncertain
as to which tort causes of action are assignable."' This uncer-
tainty provides one basis for criticizing the equivalency. But a
more fundamental criticism is that the survivability-
assignability approach places a blanket prohibition on the as-
signment of certain tort claims when, at most, only selective
invalidation of assignments is warranted. This is most appar-
ent in the typical negligence action, such as might arise from
an automobile accident.1 1 7 Today, the valuation of personal
injury claims is an everyday occurrence which has even devel-
oped into something of an art, if not a science.' Therefore,
difficulties in valuation should no longer be cited to justify the
invalidation of the assignment of such actions. Even if some of
the elements of recovery, such as pain and suffering, are diffi-
cult to appraise, this factor should be considered by the poten-
tial assignee, and not serve as a reason for invalidating the
assignment."t 9 The possibility that the assignee of a personal
injury action might use it to harass or oppress the alleged tort-
feasor, or that the claim might be entirely groundless, certainly
exists, but no more than it does in the assignment of any
property-related cause of action. There is no evidence that per-
sonal injury actions are more susceptible to being abused in
right of property, or out of an obligation, may be transferred by the owner. Upon the
death of the owner it passes to his personal representatives, except where, in the cases
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, it passes to his devisees or successor in office."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 954 (West 1954). See CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1974). The
equivalency was applied in California before the assignment of tort claims became a
statutory matter. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Martin, 22 Cal. 173 (1863).
118 See, e.g., Cooper v. Runnels, 291 P.2d 657 (Wash. 1955). Even if the statute
and interpretive case law is unambiguous in dividing torts into surviving and nonsur-
viving categories, such classifications may be susceptible to challenge on constitutional
grounds. See Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1975).
" Many jurisdictions still do not permit the survival of personal injury actions.
See W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 900 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, claims resulting from an
alleged negligent injury to the person are probably the most common tort actions which
remain unassignable. However, there is no substantive basis for distinguishing these
actions from other nonsurviving personal torts, such as defamation, which should be
treated the same as personal injury actions insofar as the matter of their assignability
is concerned.
I See generally JURY VERDICr RESEARCH, PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS
16-36 (1972).
"I See generally Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 48, 71-72
(1935).
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this manner. Furthermore, the availability of actions for defa-
mation, malicious prosecution and abuse of process minimizes
the likelihood that the assignment would be abused in one of
these ways."'0 It may be against public policy to permit a person
to conduct a business by actively seeking out the assignment
of personal injury actions against target defendants such as
transit systems, 121 or to permit an attorney to purchase claims
'2 See generally id. at 66-71.
"I Some jurisdictions have statutory provisions which would prohibit this sort of
practice and which are designed to be in furtherance of policies against maintenance,
champerty and barratry, or to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAW § 489 (McKinney 1968):
No person or co-partnership, engaged directly or indirectly in the business
of collection and adjustment of claims, and no corporation or association,
directly or indirectly, itself or by or through its officers, agents or employees,
shall solicit, buy or take an assignment of, or be in any manner interested
in buying or taking an assignment of a bond, promissory note, bill of ex-
change, book debt, or other thing in action, or any claim or demand, with
the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon;
provided however, that bills receivable, notes receivable, bills of exchange,
judgments or other things in action may be solicited, bought, or assignment
thereof taken, from any executor, administrator, assignee for the benefit of
creditors, trustee or receiver in bankruptcy, or any other person or persons
in charge of the administration, settlement or compromise of any estate,
through court actions, proceedings or otherwise. Nothing herein contained
shall affect any assignment heretofore or hereafter taken by any moneyed
corporation authorized to do business in the state of New York or its nominee
pursuant to a subrogation agreement or a salvage operation, or by any corpo-
ration organized for religious, benevolent or charitable purposes.
Any corporation or association violating the provisions of this section
shall be liable to a fine of not more than five thousand dollars; any person
or co-partnership, violating the provisions of this section, and any officer,
trustee, director, agent or employee of any person, co-partnership, corpora-
tion or association violating this section who directly, or indirectly, engages
or assists in such violation, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
This penal provision is concerned both with the prevention of the unauthorized prac-
tice of law by corporations and with champertous agreements. See generally American
Hemisphere Marine Agencies, Inc. v. Kries, 244 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. 1963); STATE
OF NE W YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION 163-64 (1941). The New York
courts have wisely construed this provision to be applicable only when the assignment
is for the primary purpose of enabling the assignee to bring an action, and not where
the assignment is incidental to some other purpose. See, e.g., American Restaurant
China Mfgs. Ass'n v. Coming Glass Works, 198 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Fairchild
Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 270 N.E.2d 691, 321 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Ct. App.
1971). In the absence of a statutory provision such as this or the one discussed in note
122 and accompanying text infra, there may be no basis for prohibiting the transfer of
assignable tort actions for any purpose, in any quantity, and to any assignee. See
McCloskey v. San Antonio Traction Co., 192 S.W. 1116 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1917).
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for the purpose of bringing an action thereon,' 2 but legislatures
are quite capable of distinguishing these situations from those
in which the assignment of a personal injury action would not
be contrary to public policy, and they have done so in some
jurisdictions.'2 A blanket prohibition against the assignment of
personal injury actions is not justified, and this has been judi-
cially recognized in a number of instances. For example, insur-
ance companies, by using legal devices and rationales which
honor form over substance, have often been permitted by
courts to become subrogated to the nonassignable personal
injury claims of an insured upon payment to the insured under
the insurance contract.124 Additionally, some courts, including
an English court, have permitted the assignment of the future
proceeds of a personal tort action even though the action itself
was nonassignable. 12 These cases again provide an example
I Some jurisdictions have statutory provisions which would prohibit such a
practice. See, e.g., N.Y. JUtICIARY LAW § 488 (McKinney 1968):
An attorney or counselor shall not:
1. Directly or indirectly, buy, take an assignment of or be in any manner
interested in buying or taking an assignment of a bond, promissory note, bill
of exchange, book debt, or other thing in action, with the intent and for the
purpose of bringing an action thereon.
2. By himself, or by or in the name of another person, either before or after
action brought, promise or give, or procure to be promised or given, a valua-
ble consideration to any person, as an inducement to placing, or in considera-
tion of having placed, in his hands, or in the hands of another person, a
demand of any kind, for the purpose of bringing an action thereon, or of
representing the claimant in the pursuit of any civil remedy for the recovery
thereof. But this subdivision does not apply to an agreement between attor-
neys and counselors, or either, to divide between themselves the compensa-
tion to be received.
3. An attorney or counselor who violates the provisions of this section is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
To constitute an offense, the primary purpose of the assignment must be to enable the
attorney to bring a suit, and not merely an incidental or contingent purpose. See Stern
v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 4 N.Y.S.2d 73 (Sup. Ct.), rehearing denied, 7
N.Y.S.2d 495 (App. Div. 1938). Attorneys in New York have a statutory charging lien
which will attach to the proceeds of a personal injury action pursuant to N.Y. JUnICIARY
LAW § 475 (McKinney 1968), and may enter into consensual liens. See Williams v.
Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882), discussed at notes 200-02 and accompanying text infra.
See also N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 490 (McKinney 1968).
"2 See notes 121-22 and accompanying text supra.
2 See generally Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
MICH. L. REv. 841, 858, 867-68 (1962).
115 The English case is Glegg v. Bromley, [1912] 3 K.B. 474. See generally Annot.,
40 A.L.R.2d 500, 512-15 (1955). This annotation correctly states that the validity of
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of honoring form over substance. '26 Still other courts have
allowed personal injury actions to be assigned by applying the
equivalency after legislation had been enacted permitting the
claims to survive.' While these latter cases infrequently ex-
plain why the inter vivos assignment of personal injury actions
suddenly becomes unobjectionable after the legislature de-
cides to allow them to pass to personal representatives, they
do represent a welcome, though somewhat belated, erosion of
the general prohibition against the assignment of choses in
action. The more recent cases which refuse to permit the as-
signment of personal injury actions '8 do so on the basis of in
terrorem arguments which have little merit. It is a bit late to
seriously suggest that such assignments are necessarily
"fraught with possibilities"'29 or made to "unscrupulous people
[who] would. . . traffic in law suits for pain and suffering.""10
II. TORT CLAIMS AS INTANGIBLE PROPERTY: MATTERS RELATING
TO THE VALIDITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSIGNMENTS OF TORT
CAUSES OF ACTION AND DERIVATIVE RIGHTS
The inherent assignability of most surviving tort causes of
action was judicially established many years ago. Today, it can
be generally stated that property-related torts are assignable,
and that personal torts may in some jurisdictions be directly
or indirectly assigned. Assignments of tort claims can arise in
a variety of situations.' 3' Probably the most familiar occurs
when an insurance company pays a claim and becomes subro-
this practice has been long established in New York. One New York court found itself
bound to adhere to this principle but criticized it on the grounds that it is founded on
a distinction which honors form over substance and fosters champerty and mainte-
nance in personal injury actions. See Grossman v. Schlosser, 244 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App.
Div. 1963).
128 See, e.g., Grossman v. Schlosser, 244 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. Div. 1963); Harvey
v. Cleman, 400 P.2d 87 (Wash. 1965).
' See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500, 508-11 (1955).
'28 See, e.g., Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Wright Oil Co., 454 S.W.2d 69 (Ark. 1970)
(citing other cases).
22 Harleysville Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lea, 410 P.2d 495, 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966).
22 Id. at 498.
,2, It has been suggested that "contract," as a separate form of civil obligation, is
"being reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort.'" G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRAcT 87 (1974). If this is correct, then the assignment of "tort-like" rights may in
the future take place in additional contexts.
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gated to the cause of action against the tortfeasor. 3 2 However,
assignments have also been made in less familiar contexts.
Sales of personal and real property have been accompanied by
the assignment of tort actions for injury to the property which
occurred prior to the transaction. 3M Tort claims have been as-
signed to and then reassigned by receivers or assignees for the
benefit of creditors.'13 Multiple victims of a tort have assigned
their claims to one of their number for the purpose of bringing
suit. 35 Liquidating partnerships have assigned tort causes of
actions to former partners, '36 and tort causes of action have
been assigned by business and nonbusiness entities to succes-
sor entities. 3 7 Tort claims have been assigned to satisfy a
preexisting debt, 3 ' and creditors have sought a consensual
security interest in tort causes of action, judgments, or settle-
ments.'39 Assignments have been made to secure the payment
for services rendered by physicians and hospitals."' Similarly,
attorneys have taken such assignments to secure the payment
of contingent fees. '4 These examples illustrate the variety of
'1 See generally note 124 and accompanying text supra; R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT
ON INSURANCE LAw 148-53 (1971).
'3 See, e.g., Balfour Guthrie & Co. v. Hansen, 38 Cal. Rptr. 525 (Cal. Ct. App.
1964); Mahoney v. Ogden, 174 N.Y.S.2d 623 (App. Div. 1958); Appliance Inv. Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 27, aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
'" See, e.g., In re Alfred Frank, Inc., 104 N.Y.S.2d 735 (App. Div. 1951); Assets
Collecting Co. v. Myers, 152 N.Y.S. 930 (App. Div. 1915). Tort claims may also pass
to trustees under the federal bankruptcy law. See generally 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 70.28 (3), (6) (4th ed. 1971).
'3 See Benedict v. Guardian Trust Co., 86 N.Y.S. 370 (App. Div. 1908).
'3 See Johnson v. Bennett, 5 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 331 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1868).
'3 See Grocer's Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 48 Barb. 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866). Cf. Associa-
tion for Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. New York Post Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d
767 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
'3' See In re Wood's Estate, 144 N.Y.S.2d 880 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
'3 See, e.g., In re Modell, 71 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1934); Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Wright Oil Co., 454 S.W.2d 69 (Ark. 1970); Barnes v. United Ry. & Elec.
Co., 116 A. 855 (Md. 1922); Grubaugh v. Simon J. Murphy Co., 177 N.W. 217 (Mich.
1920); Curtis v. Curtis, 96 N.W. 32 (Mich. 1903); In re City of New York, 95 N.Y.S.2d
26 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Kittinger Witt Co. v. Brookins, 172 N.E. 297 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929);
Beck v. Germantown Cricket Club, 45 Pa. Super. 358 (1910); Globe Aircraft Corp. v.
Thompson, 203 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1947); Harvey v. Cleman, 400 P.2d 87
(Wash. 1965).
"I See, e.g., Neilson Realty Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemn. Corp., 262
N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Reddy v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Co., 11 N.Y.S.2d
88 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
"I See, e.g., Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882). See generally Wentworth,
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situations in which tort claims or their derivative rights can be
assigned, and indicate that such rights may properly be consid-
ered as an asset of the tort victim. Due regard must be given
to the problems and pitfalls which lie between the creation of
the cause of action and the realization of a fund; however,
potential assignees and their attorneys remain the best judges
of the value of a particular claim and the utility of accepting
its assignment. In making such judgments, the likelihood that
a fund will be derived and the purpose of the assignment will
undoubtedly be crucial factors. Thus, although tort causes of
action could never secure a continuing lending arrangement
which depends on the rapid turnover of the security (e.g., ac-
counts receivable financing), they can serve to at least partially
secure a single loan if some recovery can be reasonably antici-
pated during the term of the loan.
Having established that tort claims can be assigned in
both personal and commercial transactions, it becomes neces-
sary to consider other matters which bear on the desirability
and feasibility of accepting an assignment of a tort claim. Spe-
cifically, those aspects of the law which govern the parties to
the original assignment and other individuals, including the
tortfeasor, other assignees, and creditors of the assignor who
might assert an interest in the claim, must be discussed. This
discussion, however, must be prefaced by a more precise char-
acterization of the type of property represented by tort claims
and their derivative rights.
Tort causes of action and derivative judgment and settle-
ment rights are intangible personalty. 1 2 Furthermore, they are
nonpledgeable intangibles because they are not evidenced by
writings indispensable to their transfer. '43 "Pledgeability" be-
comes significant in connection with the manner in which an
assignment of the intangible collateral is made enforceable
Attorney's Liens-A Survey and a Proposal, 35 CONN. B.J. 191, 196 (1961).
112 See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7 (2d ed. 1955). The
author is willing to assume that tort claims are "property" because assignors, assignees
and courts have treated them as such, but readily admits that there is more to the
concept of property than mere transferability. See Woody's Olympia Lumber Co. v.
Roney, 513 P.2d 849 (Wash. 1973). See generally 4 A. CoRain, CONTRACTS § 860 (1951);
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REv. 357 (1954).
"1 See generally 1 GiLMORE § 1.3.
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against third persons,"' which for a tort claim can be deter-
mined through ascertaining the body of law which governs the
relationship between the assignor, the assignee, and third par-
ties.
A. The Applicability of Article Nine to Tort Claim
Assignments
The relevance of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code to the assignment of tort claims is not immediately ap-
parent. The Article broadly applies "to any transaction (re-
gardless of its form) which is intended to create a security
interest in personal property .... ,,1 Thus, it might seem to
control a security interest in a tort cause of action or derivative
rights.' However, rights "represented by a judgment" and
transfers "in whole or in part of. . . any claim arising out of
tort" are expressly excluded from the scope of Article Nine on
the theory that these intangibles do not customarily serve as
commercial collateral. 47 This decision by the Code's draftsmen
appears correct when viewed in light of the types of intangible
property, such as commercial accounts receivable, that are in-
cluded within the scope of Article Nine.' Moreover, it is con-
sistent with the pre-UCC personal property security legislation
in many jurisdictions which also did not include tort claims
and judgments within its scope."4 Excluding these intangibles
from Article Nine may also evince an intent to have them
" Id.
"4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(1)(a) (1962 Official Text) [hereinafter
cited as UCC]. Differences between this version of the UCC and the 1972 Official Text
will be noted when relevant.
"4 Id. "'Security interest' means an interest in personal property . . . which
secures payment or performance of an obligation." UCC § 1-201 (37). The UCC applies
this defined term to consensual interests in personalty and uses the undefined term
"lien" to describe nonconsensual interests. See UCC § 9-102(2). This and other terms,
such as "security agreement," "secured party," and "collateral," are used in this paper
with the same meaning given them by the UCC. See UCC §§ 9-105(1)(h), (i), (c).
"I See UCC §§ 9-104(h),(k), Comment 8. The exclusions contained in § 9-104 do
not, however, exclude from Article Nine security interests in all types of collateral
which do not customarily serve as commercial collateral. For example, a security
interest in a decedent's estate has been held to be within the scope of Article Nine.
See In re Bowen, 5 UCC REP. SERv. 261 (D. Ore. 1968). See generally 1 GILMORE § 10.7.
"Is Executory contract rights constitute another commercially important class of
intangible property within Article Nine. See generally Coogan, Intangibles as Collat-
eral Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARv. L. REv. 997, 999-1003 (1964).
"' See generally 1 GILMORE chs. 7, 8.
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handled on a state-by-state basis, each jurisdiction being free
to apply its own public policies.'50 The appearance that Article
Nine is not relevant to security interests in rights arising
from the commission of a tort is further substantiated by its
inapplicability "to a transfer of an interest or claim in or under
any policy of insurance .... 151 Although this exclusion was
intended to apply primarily to the assignment of life insurance
policies,1 52 it is arguably broad enough to exclude the assign-
ment of a claim under a casualty insurance policy arising out
of a tortious act by a third person.
5 3
Although it appears that tort claims are outside the scope
of Article Nine, a closer analysis reveals that a tort victim has
the potential for obtaining property rights, derived from the
tort, which might be subject to Article Nine. A typical se-
quence of events which could follow the commission of a tort
will serve to illustrate the point. In considering the sequence of
events, it must be kept in mind that property can become the
subject of-an Article Nine security interest in two ways: first,
when the security interest is created directly in the property,
in which case the property may be referred to as "original"
collateral; and second, when the security interest is imposed on
the "proceeds" of original collateral.' 54 "Proceeds" are defined
by Article Nine as including "whatever is received when collat-
eral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise dis-
posed of.' ' 55 Moreover, it should be recalled that a security
interest in property in which the debtor will have no ownership
until a future time can be granted under Article Nine.'56
11 See generally Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article Nine of the
U. C. C.-Part IV. The Scope of Article Nine, 79 CoM. L.J. 79, 83 (1972). There are
nonuniform statutes relating to the assignment of judgments and causes of action
which might have required modification or repeal in order to avoid conflict with Article
Nine. See note 197 infra.
UCC § 9-104(g).
5 See UCC § 9-104, Comment 7. See generally 1 GILMORE § 10.7.
" See R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE §§ 6-8, at 150-51 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HENSON].
151 See generally Weiss, Original Collateral and Proceeds: A Code Puzzle, 42
N.Y.U.L. REV. 785, 803-04 (1967).
I's UCC § 9-306(1). The term also includes the account arising when the right to
payment is earned under a contract. Money, checks and the like are referred to as
"cash proceeds" while all other types of proceeds are "non-cash." Id.
"I See UCC § 9-204(3). It will not attach and cannot be perfected, however, until
the debtor has rights in the collateral. Id. § 9-204(1); § 9-303(1).
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In the typical sequence of events, settlement occurs at
some point after suit is filed but prior to judgment. In the
settlement a tort victim obtains a contractual right to pay-
ment from the tortfeasor, or his insurer, which constitutes a
new form of intangible personal property derived from the orig-
inal tort claim. ' When the tortfeasor or his insurer issues a
check to satisfy this obligation another form of derivative
property has come into existence-the victim-payee's rights on
the check. Still another intangible derivative right is produced
when the check is cashed or deposited-the rights in the fund.
While the security assignment of the original tort claim is not
within the scope of Article Nine, derivative settlement rights
are excluded only if they are "claim[s] arising out of tort."'58
Therefore, these rights could constitute original collateral
within Article Nine. Security interests in instruments,"9 such
as checks, are governed by Article Nine, and a tort victim's
rights on a settlement check could constitute original collateral
if not excluded as "arising out of tort." Additionally, a security
interest in the monetary proceeds of the settlement could be
original collateral within Article Nine, subject to this exclu-
sionary language, if the funds are not deposited in a savings,
passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank, savings
and loan association, or like organization. Security interests in
these deposit accounts are removed from the scope of Article
Nine by another exclusionary provision."' But even if the mon-
etary proceeds could not be "original" collateral within the
scope of Article Nine because of this latter exclusion, once they
go into such an account they might constitute Article Nine
"proceeds" which are within the scope of Article Nine as are,
arguably, the check and the settlement agreement rights.''
,57 It thus became possible to sue on a contract for what amounts to liquidated
tort damages. See, e.g., Greenleaf v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 151 N.W.
879, 881 (N.D. 1915).
UCC § 9-104(k).
See UCC § 9-105(1)(g).
" Such deposit accounts are excluded from the scope of Article Nine by § 9-
104(k) which provides: "This article does not apply. . . to a transfer in whole or in
part of. . .any deposit, savings, passbook or like account maintained with a bank,
savings and loan association, credit union or like organization."
" See UCC §§ 9-306(1), (4). See also Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee
W. Bank, 214 N.W.2d 33 (Wis. 1974). See generally Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The
Outer Fringes of Article Nine: Subordination Agreements, Security Interests in Money
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If Article Nine's exclusions do not embrace a security as-
signment of these present or future property rights derived
from a tort cause of action, then these nonexcluded rights (and
their proceeds) are subject to Article Nine through its broad
scope provision." 2 Consistent with this conclusion are the
Code's comments which suggest that the scope language
should be broadly interpreted in keeping with Article Nine's
main purpose: to provide a comprehensive scheme for all
nonexcluded consensual security interests in personalty.1
3
However, the one reported case that relates to this issue,
Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bargain City U.S.A.,
Inc., 64 provides contrary authority.
In Arkwright, an insurer had issued a policy covering loss
of rental income caused by property damage, including damage
resulting from the impact of an aircraft. A United States Navy
jet had crashed into one of the insured properties, causing a
substantial loss of rental income. The insured's claim under the
policy was held in abeyance pending his effort to recover from
the United States by means of filing a claim with the Navy.
0 5
The Navy and the insured reached a settlement, and the Navy
agreed to recommend to the Bureau of the Budget that the
amount be paid. At this juncture, the insured requested that
the insurer advance him funds, pending payment by the
United States. The advance was made pursuant to an agree-
ment which provided that the insured would, at the insurer's
request, execute and deliver such instruments as would author-
ize the United States to make payment directly to the insurer;
and that the insurer would pay to the insured any amolmt
received from the United States in excess of the amount ad-
vanced.
and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 HARv. L.
REv. 229, 261-63 (1965). The scope provisions of the 1972 Official Text of the Uniform
Commercial Code expressly state that deposit accounts can be proceeds within the
meaning of Article Nine. See UCC § 9-104(1) (1972 Official Text).
162 See UCC § 9-102. The relationship between the scope provisions of Article Nine
and its proceeds provision is discussed at notes 185-86 and accompanying text infra.
'6 See Comments to UCC §§ 9-101, 102, 104.
,6 251 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d. 701 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 825 (1967).
'" The claim was filed pursuant to the Military Claims Act of 1956, 10 U.S.C. §
2733 (1959).
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After receiving the advance, the insured filed a petition
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.166 The insurer did not
formally appear or file a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding
even though it was scheduled as an unsecured creditor for the
amount of its advance and the claim against the United States
was scheduled as an asset of the insured. After the arrangement
was confirmed and terminated, the insurer refused to accept as
an unsecured creditor a payment of 15 percent of its total
advance. Subsequently, the United States appropriated the
amount of the settlement and the insurer instituted suit to
recover its advance, initially succeeding in requiring the in-
sured to deposit the fund into court.
The agreement between the insurer and its insured pro-
vided for an actual loan. The federal district court emphasized
this,'67 and the circuit court of appeals indicated that the in-
sured was to repay the difference if the amount received from
the government was less than the amount advanced, and that
the advance did not prejudice the insured's right to make a
claim under the policy. ' Since the transaction was a loan and
not a payment pursuant to the policy, the insurer, if it was to
have a claim to the appropriated fund, could not claim rights
through subrogation.'69 Instead, its rights would have to be
realized through a consensual assignment or some other
means.
If there had been a consensual assignment to the insurer,
the rights assigned could have been either the insured's tort
action against the Navy, the derivative contractual rights
under the settlement agreement negotiated with the Navy, or
the derivative rights in the fund appropriated by the govern-
ment. As suggested, the assignment of such derivative rights
11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1959).
251 F. Supp. at 223.
373 F.2d at 703.
'' A number of courts have held that the rights which a construction surety ob-
tains by virtue of subrogation, upon the performance of its contractual commitments
under payment or performance bonds, are not based on a consensual security interest
but are equitable rights not subject to Article Nine. See generally J. WHrrE & R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-5 (1972).
The insurance policy in Arkwright provided that the insurer could require the insured
to assign all rights against third persons to the extent payment was made by the
insurer, but no payment had been made under the policy.
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for security is arguably within the scope of Article Nine, in
which case Article Nine would apply to determine the rights of
the insurer qua secured creditor in the Chapter XI proceed-
ings.Y0 The district court did not initially consider Article Nine
because it found no assignment of any present or future prop-
erty, but rather a mere agreement by the insured to pay a debt
from a designated future fund. 7 ' Then, assuming that the in-
surer's claim against the insured was valid, the court concluded
that enforcement of the claim against the insured was barred
by the bankruptcy proceeding. Inexplicably, the lower court
then declared that the insurer's claimed lien was unperfected
under the Uniform Commercial Code, a seemingly unnecessary
finding in view of the court's initial determination that there
had been no assignment.'72 The court ignored the exclusions
from the scope of Article Nine discussed above.
On appeal, the Third Circuit questioned the pertinence of
the district court's declaration, stating in a footnote that the
transaction was "beyond the pale" of Article Nine because the
claim arose out of a tort.'73 The circuit court also referred to
the Article's exclusion of transfers to an interest or claim in or
under any insurance policy. 74 It did not, however, analyze the
applicability of Article Nine beyond these observations. Most
of the opinion was devoted to the determination that, assuming
a non-Article Nine interest had been created, it had been extin-
guished in the Chapter XI bankruptcy proceedings when the
insurer failed to assert its equitable rights.'75
The fact pattern presented in Arkwright was not ideal for
II 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1959). The fact that the federal government was the
tortfeasor and potential obligor under the settlement agreement would not by itself
remove the assignment from the scope of Article Nine. See generally 1 GILMORE § 10.7,
ch. 13. On appeal the Third Circuit stated that the equities of the parties would not
be affected by the Federal Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1959), but would be
determined by state law.
I' The parties authorized the district court to decide the case as if they had filed
summary judgment motions. The court held that the fund was not impressed with a
trust or equitable lien in favor of the insurer. 251 F. Supp. at 225-26. This determina-
tion was not necessary for the Third Circuit to hold against the insurer. See note 175
and accompanying text infra.
"1 251 F. Supp. at 228.
"1 373 F.2d 704 nn.7 & 9. This language was apparently borrowed from Professor
Gilmore. See note 177 and accompanying text infra.
"1 373 F.2d 704 nn.7 & 9. See notes 151-53 and accompanying text supra.
"I' Id. at 706.
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determining the scope of Article Nine in relation to tort-derived
rights. It is clear from the facts that there had been no security
assignment prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and, even assuming that there was a consensual as-
signment, the loan agreement did not specifically identify the
collateral. However, even if rights such as those under the set-
tlement agreement or in the future fund had been expressly
secured prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, the court still
should have concluded that Article Nine was inapplicable. If
the scope provisions of Article Nine, with their accompanying
official comments, are construed to include certain rights de-
rived from a tort cause of action, the Code's exclusion of "any
claim arising out of tort" would become meaningless due to the
ease with which it could be circumvented by assignment of
these rights. Placing these assignments outside Article Nine's
coverage does no great violence to the exclusionary language,
as such rights would never have existed but for the commission
of a tort. Exclusion is appropriate for it was the more commer-
cially familiar types of collateral and transactions which con-
cerned the Code's draftsmen and which were the objects of
their talents. The security assignment of a tort cause of action
or derivative right was an unfamiliar commercial transaction
involving unusual collateral. The tort claim exclusion, recom-
mended in 1956 by the Editorial Board for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, was intended to achieve greater clarity and pre-
cision in defining the transactions "entirely" excluded from
Article Nine."6 Professor Gilmore, who was intimately involved
in the development of the Article, has stated that the exclusion
reflects the notion that such assignments are "beyond the pale
with respect to a statute devoted to commercial financing."'77
If further evidence is needed to demonstrate that Article
Nine's draftsmen desired to leave the security assignments of
tort causes of action and derivative rights to extra-Code law,
it may be obtained by considering how the Article would apply
"I' See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMNMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 257-58 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 1956 RECOMENDATIONS]. This
recommendation was pursuant to a suggestion by the New York Law Revision Com-
mission. See STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION ComMISSION 466 (1956).
"1 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS at 258; See 1 GILMORE at 316.
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to the security assignment of a derivative right. For example,
a tort victim's rights under a contract of settlement can be
characterized under Article Nine as a general intangible.' To
perfect a security interest in a general intangible it is necessary
to file a financing statement. Under two of the Article's three
filing alternatives, filing would be in the office of the secretary
of state or some other centralized location. 179 The third alterna-
tive requires central filing and, in some situations, a filing in
the county where the debtor resides or has a place of business. 8 '
In the case of tort-derived rights, however, it is debatable
whether any filing should be necessary. 8' Even assuming that
a filing requirement is warranted and litigation is pending or
has been settled, would not a filing in court be more appropri-
ate for giving public notice? It is unlikely that either Article
Nine's draftsmen or the legislators who enacted the Code care-
fully considered these questions.
Applying Article Nine to tort-derived rights could lead to
additional difficult problems. Consider, for example, the as-
signment of a tort cause of action to an assignee who immedi-
ately notifies the tortfeasor. There is authority for the proposi-
118 See UCC § 9-106:
"Account" means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper. "Con-
tract right" means any right to payment under a contract not yet earned by
performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper. "General
intangibles" means any personal property (including things in action) other
than goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, documents and instru-
ments. All rights earned or unearned under a charter or other contract in-
volving the use or hire of a vessel and all rights incident to the charter or
contract are contract rights and neither accounts nor general intangibles.
(Emphasis added).
If a tort victim's right to payment was not yet earned by performance, such as where
the tort victim has failed to deliver an executed release from liability required by the
settlement agreement, then the collateral might be characterized as a "contract right."
Under UCC § 9-106 (1972 Official Text) the term "contract right" has been elimi-
nated. Rights under a settlement agreement must, under this version, be characterized
as a general intangible.
"I See UCC § 9-401.
180 Id.
" Under some circumstances a tort victim's rights under a settlement agreement
may be characterized as a contract right. See note 178 supra. No filing is required to
perfect a security interest in an "insolated" assignment of contract rights. See UCC
§ 9-302(1)(e).
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tion that such an assignment carries with it rights in the ulti-
mate judgment, and that the way to perfect such an assign-
ment is through notice to the tortfeasor. 112 Similarly, a court
might reason that the assignment of the cause of action carries
with it rights in any future settlement agreement. Article Nine
clearly cannot cover the assignment of the cause of action itself
because of the exclusion for claims arising out of tort, but it
might be interpreted to cover rights under a future settlement
agreement. If a priority conflict were to arise between two par-
ties who are secured in what is ultimately the same property
(one in the cause of action, the other in the future settlement
rights), the problem is compounded because the two security
assignments are arguably controlled by different bodies of law.
The tort cause of action is governed by extra-UCC doctrine
relating to assignments, while the derivative rights are subject
to Article Nine. Article Nine was not drafted to deal with such
a conflict."'
The foregoing analysis of the scope of Article Nine leads
to the conclusion that the draftsmen did not intend the Article
to apply to the assignment of any rights derived from the com-
mission of a tort. Since Article Nine's exclusionary provisions
can be interpreted to exclude tort claims and their derivative
rights from being original collateral, they should be so con-
strued. This would result in the application of the common law
and equitable doctrine of assignments to both security and
nonsecurity assignments of tort causes of action and derivative
rights. There is, however, one additional Article Nine problem
which must be considered before turning attention to this doc-
trine. The question may be stated as follows: Can a creditor
who has a valid Article Nine security interest in personalty
claim as proceeds the tort cause of action and derivative rights
which arise out of injury to that personalty? 4 For example, if
'" See generally 2 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 1052-58 (1925); 2 Gru.oRE § 25.6.
See note 204 and accompanying text infra.
- Cf. UCC § 9-310.
lu "Proceeds" are defined in UCC § 9-306(1) as "whatever is received when collat-
eral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of." A secured party
obtains his continuing interest in "proceeds" by virtue of UCC § 9-306(2):
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues
in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by
the debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured party in the
security agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any identifiable pro-
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a third person negligently damages an automobile in which
there exists a security interest, does the secured party's secu-
rity extend to the fund created by the third person or his in-
surer upon payment for the loss? Except when Article Nine
expressly provides otherwise,"8 5 property rights that cannot
pass through the Article's "front door" as original collateral
cannot enter via the "back door" as proceeds."6 Therefore, the
previously discussed exclusions from the scope of Article Nine
serve as a basis for concluding that tort causes of action and
rights derived therefrom can never be proceeds. The two re-
ported cases which have considered this question, however,
have reached this result on the basis of the Article's definition
of proceeds, without reliance on the scope provisions.
In the first case,"8 7 the secured party attempted to inter-
vene in its debtor's trespass action against a defendant who
had allegedly destroyed the collateral, an automobile. Through
an oversight there was no insurance protecting the secured
party against loss of or damage to the collateral. The court held
that the security interest did not make the secured party a
permissible intervenor, and that Article Nine's definition of
proceeds does not extend to situations where the collateral has
depreciated in value through no fault of the debtor. The opin-
ion was silent concerning possible Article Nine scope problems.
In the second case, 8 which reached the same general result,
ceeds including collections received by the debtor.
Arguably, the phrase "received by the debtor" applies only to "collections" and not
to "proceeds." See HENSON § 6-8 at 153 n.18.
It is interesting to note that Article Two of the UCC may enable a seller of goods
to sue a third party who injures the goods. See UCC § 2-722. If a seller does have this
right, there is some basis in Article Two for arguing that the financer of the sale can
succeed to that right. See UCC § 2-707. See generally Shapiro v. Union Bank and
Savings Co., 458 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1972).
'" "Proceeds" under Article Nine may include some property rights which are not
within the scope of Article Nine as original collateral. An example under the 1962
Official Text is deposit accounts. See notes 160-61 and accompanying text supra.
11 The opposite conclusion would lead to anomolous results. Consider a properly
perfected Article Nine security interest in a motor vehicle and proceeds, the vehicle
then being exchanged by the debtor for an acre of realty without the permission of the
secured party. Although the scope of Article Nine is expressly limited to personal
property and fixtures, if "proceeds" were not limited to property which is within the
scope of the Article, the secured party could claim a continuing Article Nine security
interest in the realty. See UCC § 9-102(1).
117 Hoffman v. Snack, 2 UCC REP. SERV. 862 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
I'l In re Hix, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 925 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
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the attorney for the perfected secured party and the debtor had
successfully negotiated a settlement with the insurer of a third
person who had damaged the debtor's automobile.'89 The
debtor declared bankruptcy before the settlement was paid,
and the trustee challenged the secured party's claim to the
fund on the ground that the security agreement covered the
automobile only. In holding for the trustee, the referee in bank-
ruptcy found that when the debtor became bankrupt there had
been no assignment of his cause of action to the secured party,
and that there had been no sale, exchange, or disposition of the
collateral within the Article Nine definition of proceeds. The
referee noted the scope provisions excluding the transfer of an
interest or claim in or under any policy of insurance and the
transfer of claims arising out of tort, but expressly refused to
consider their relation to the problem as a question "not before
the court."'9
Although both of these cases were decided by courts of
original jurisdiction, they are consistent in reasoning and result
with a more extensive and authoritative line of cases holding
that a secured party cannot claim as "proceeds" the debtor's
rights against his own insurer or the fund created through the
settlement with such an insurer.'91 If one reads Article Nine's
definition of proceeds as requiring a voluntary disposition by
the debtor, there are two bases for arguing that the fund gener-
ated when the collateral is tortiously damaged or destroyed by
a third person is not proceeds, because the disposition was
neither voluntary nor by the debtor.'9 2
The 1972 Official Text of Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which has been enacted in at least 10
'" Although the opinion does not discuss the possibility, Article Nine may require
that proceeds be "received" by the debtor. See note 184 supra. The requirement was
met in this case since the debtor had "received" rights to payment under the settle-
ment argeement.
9 UCC REP. SERV. at 928.
'g' See, e.g., Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 222 A.2d 571 (R.I. 1966). Contra, Firemen's Fund Am.
Ins. Co. v. Ken-Lori Knits, Inc., 16 UCC REP. SERV. 1407 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See
generally HENSON § 6-8; Henson, Insurance Proceeds as "Proceeds" Under Article
Nine, 18 CATH. L. REV. 453 (1969). It has also been held that a check in payment of a
judgment for breach of warranty for defective collateral is not proceeds within Article
Nine. See In re Continental Trucking, Inc., 16 UCC REP. SERv. 526 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
,12 Cf. HENSON at 148.
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states, '93 has defined proceeds to include "[i]nsurance payable
by reason of loss or damage to the collateral. . . except to the
extent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the
security agreement." ' This amendment was designed to re-
verse the result achieved in the aforementioned cases where the
secured party attempted t5 reach the proceeds of the debtor's
insurance. The "except" clause was intended by the draftsmen
to indicate that if the insurance contract specifies a third party
to whom the insurance is payable, Article Nine will not inter-
fere with the performance of the insurance contract.193 Due to
the revised definition of proceeds, a secured party with an Arti-
cle Nine security interest in collateral damaged by a tortfeasor
might arguably succeed to the insurance proceeds paid by the
tortfeasor's insurer. Although such a result would not interfere
with the performance of the tortfeasor's insurance contract,
this interpretation could be troublesome if the Article Nine
secured party was challenged by an assignee of the tort claim
or its derivative rights, because such a priority conflict is not
dealt with by Article Nine."'
B. Tort Claim Assignments and Assignment Doctrine
If Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code does not
control the validity of security assignments of tort claims and
derivative rights, then these assignments, along with those
which are not made for security, will be regulated in most
jurisdictions by the common law and equitable doctrine of as-
signments.'97 No attempt will be made to generally review these
,13 See CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 7 650A. The new version has been
adopted in 14 states, but does not become effective in four of these until 1976.
19, UCC § 9-306(1) (1972 Official Text). The scope of Article Nine was also
amended to accomodate this broadened definition of "proceeds." Id. § 9-104(g).
195 UCC § 9-306 (1972 Official Text), Reasons for 1972 Change. See generally
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW COMMITTEE
FOR ARTICLE NINE OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE FINAL REPORT 220 (1971).
"I' See notes 182-83 and accompanying text supra. The broadened definition of
proceeds does not apply to other kinds of substitute collateral which are not the result
of a voluntary disposition of the original collateral by the debtor, such as a fund created
through payment to the debtor of a settlement by an uninsured tortfeasor. Such dis-
tinctions may be difficult to justify conceptually. See Hawkland, The Proposed
Amendments to Article Nine of the UCC, Part II: Proceeds, 77 CoM. L.J. 12, 13 (1972).
"I See generally 1 GILMORE at 315-16. Some jurisdictions have statutes which
require filing a notice of the assignment of a cause of action or judgment. The filing
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doctrines, for such review is available from a variety of
sources."" However, attention must be given to the priority
problems which could face the assignee of a tort cause of action
because of the nature of the property assigned. Assuming that
the assignment is made after the cause of action has accrued
but before a fund has been produced, the fund can have no
existence until some future date. Consequently, the assignee's
security is actually in a fund which may not logically seem
susceptible to either present ownership or transfer. According
to Professor Gilmore in his treatise on personal property secu-
rity, the priority issue created is whether one may make a
present transfer of future property which, when the property
"is acquired, will be entitled to priority over claims which have
meantime accrued." '99 Separating future rights which have a
sufficient probability of obtaining eventual existence so as to
be susceptible to an effective present assignment from those
which do not has been a troublesome task for the courts.2"' In
the case of future rights derived from a tort cause of action, it
is still necessary to resort.to the law of assignments, in which
case a close reading of Professor Gilmore's analysis of the as-
signment of future intangibles is most helpful.2"' He uses a New
York Court of Appeals decision to demonstrate that at one time
in New York present assignability required only that there be
a reasonable expectancy that a fund would ultimately exist. In
his analysis of this case, Williams v. Ingersoll,12 Professor Gil-
more considered its applicability to future funds which were
not the result of a tort, for example, the bonanza which a pro-
spector might reap if he discovers uranium .2 3 Nevertheless, its
particular significance as a case involving a future fund arising
out of a tort claim makes it worthy of additional discussion.
In Williams the plaintiffs were New York attorneys who
many or may not affect the rights of third persons. Compare TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6636 (1969), with IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-1-31-1 (1973).
"I These sources would include 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS ch. 15 (3rd ed. 1960);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 7 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973); 4 CORBIN chs.
47-51 (1951).
' 1 GILMORE at 229.
See generally id. § 12.9.
See id. §§ 7.10-7.12, 12.9.
' 89 N.Y. 508, 54 N.Y.S. App. 749 (1882).
1 3 See 1 GILMORE § 7.12.
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were representing a client named Heath in a number of legal
actions. Uneasy about compensation for their services, they
entered into an agreement with Heath whereby he gave them
a lien upon any sum to which he might become entitled
through these actions. One such action was a malicious prose-
cution suit then pending against the Ingersolls. A judgment
creditor of Heath attempted to reach the fund created by the
malicious prosecution action through attachment proceedings
in Connecticut, where one of the Ingersolls resided; and in New
York the plaintiffs brought an action to enforce their lien. The
first question facing the New York Court of Appeals was the
relative priority as between the attorneys and the judgment
creditor. In resolving this dispute the court initially noted that
the attorneys' lien was not created by operation of law, but was
consensual, arising out of the contractual agreement with
Heath. The court was not troubled by the fact that the consen-
sual lien was upon damages to be recovered in a personal,
nonassignable cause of action because, under equitable
doctrine, the assignment of a tort action automatically ex-
tended to any future proceeds." 4 The court concluded that this
automatic attachment in equity, coupled with the fact that the
fund had a potential existence because the action against the
Ingersolls was pending at the time of the assignment, was suffi-
cient to make the assignment effective against the subsequent
rights of the lien creditor who had not obtained a bona fide
payment from the Ingersolls. Neither the Ingersolls' lack of
notice of the attorneys' lien until after commencement of the
Connecticut proceedings, nor the proceedings in Connecticut
themselves, had any effect on the court's conclusion that the
attorneys' lien had priority over the judgment creditor.
After discussing the Williams case, Professor Gilmore ana-
lyzed subsequent opinions of the New York Court of Appeals
concerning the assignment of future funds and lamented that
two of the opinions suggested a turning away from the sound
position taken in Williams and the general trend in the United
States. He argued that these two opinions should be narrowly
restricted to their respective facts.0 5 The cases involved an
201 89 N.Y. at 521, 54 N.Y.S. App. at 752.
2 1 GILMORE § 7.12.
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assignment of future proceeds from the sale of a seat on the
New York Stock Exchange and the assignment of a future re-
fund which would become due if the assignor's application for
a liquor license was rejected, or if the license was granted and
then surrendered or cancelled.2 8 These developments need not
be analyzed here because in Stathos v. Murphy,27 decided after
Professor Gilmore's treatise was published, the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed an opinion of the appellate division
restricting the application of the earlier two opinions. Although
Stathos is not broad authority for the proposition that priority
is to be measured from the date of assignment for all types of
future funds derived from any source,28 it does hold that prior-
ity is to be measured in this manner when a cause of action is
assigned after the suit to generate the fund has been
commenced.
209
Stathos involved an assignment of a claim for breach of
contract after the suit had been filed. The assignment, which
was made to satisfy a prior debt of the assignor, was absolute
in form. 20 The assignee's right to the fund produced by the
settlement of the action was challenged by judgment creditors
of the assignor who had obtained their judgment after the as-
signment but prior to the creation of the settlement fund.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of
the appellate division, which had distinguished the assignment
of present rights which have not ripened into a fund, such as
existing choses in action, from assignments of future claims,
such as the cause of action arising out of some future tort or
2 These two opinions are In re City of New York v. Beford Bar & Grill, 141 N.E.2d
575, 161 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1957) and In re Grunner, 68 N.E.2d 514 (N.Y. 1946). Williams
may arguably have been overruled in Cordaro v. Cordaro, 235 N.Y.S.2d 289 (App.
Div.), aff'd mem., 191 N.E.2d 676, 241 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1963). See discussion in note 212
infra.
207 276 N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. Div. 1966), aff'd, 281 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1967).
"" See Harold Moorstein & Co. v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 296 N.Y.S.2d 2 (App. Div.
1968), afl'd, 254 N.E.2d 766, 306 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1969).
2c9 276 N.Y.S.2d at 733. See also In re Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Martin Lutz
Appellate Printers, Inc., 498 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1974).
2,' The opinion does not specify whether the assignment was intended solely as
security. Under the best view it makes no difference, insofar as an assignee's priorities
are concerned, whether his assignment is absolute in form or conditioned upon the
happening of some event, such as a default in the repayment of a debt owed by the
assignor to the assignee. In either case the assignee's priority should be measured from
the time of the assignment when an immediately effective assignment is actually
intended as is normally the case. See generally 4 CORBIN § 875 (1951); 1 GmMORE § 7.5,
at 208-10.
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unearned wages under some future contract of employment.
The appellate division reasoned that in the former instance
there is an effective assignment of present rights even though
the value of the rights is uncertain. Unlike the Williams court,
however, the court in Stathos placed little weight on the fact
that the suit had been filed prior to assignment. It was satisfied
that the accrual of the action to the assignor was enough to give
the future fund sufficient present existence so as to be
susceptible to a present assignment. The court attempted to
draw a further, and possibly misleading, distinction between
an assignment of a chose in action and an assignment of future
settlement or judgment proceeds derived therefrom. 2"1 As to the
derivative proceeds, the priority of the assignee would, in the
court's view, be measured from the genesis of the funds if the
transfer was intended to take effect in the future. Although
the distinction could be of practical importance to a lawyer
drafting an assignment of a cause of action, the court did not
intend to challenge the holding of Williams, which provided
that an assignee's priority in rights derived from an existing
cause of action should be measured from the date of the assign-
ment when an immediately effective assignment is contem-
plated. To the contrary, the Stathos court concluded not only
that Williams was the leading New York precedent and that it
was in accord with the general doctrine as pronounced in the
treatises, but also that it applied a fortiori to the instant case
and required that the assignee be given priority in the settle-
ment proceeds. The court took pains to reconcile the New York
cases involving the assignment of the proceeds of nonassignable
tort claims which reached or suggested a result contra to
Williams.21 1
2,, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 729-30.
"I The Stathos court was most concerned with Cordaro v. Cordaro, 235 N.Y.S.2d
289, afl'd mem., 191 N.E.2d 676, 241 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1963), which reaches a result
contra to Williams, but without referring to Williams. See note 202 and accompanying
text supra. The Stathos court distinguished Cordaro, and others like it, on the theory
that because Cordaro involved nonassignable causes of action, it was necessary to find
that the assignment did not take effect until the fund had been produced. See 276
N.Y.S.2d at 731. Since Stathos involved an assignable cause of action, Williams tech-
nically may remain overruled, although Cordaro's failure to deal with Williams and
the broad reaffirmation of Williams in Stathos must cast considerable doubt on
Cordaro's vitality. See 276 N.Y.S.2d 727, 732-33. Most of the New York cases which
involved a priority contest between the assignee of the proceeds of a nonassignable tort
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The statement in Stathos that Williams is in accord with
the general view in this country that priority is measured from
the time of the assignment should be qualified. Although gen-
erally accurate with respect to assignable choses in action not
within the scope of Article Nine, '21 3 it must be noted that there
are cases in other jurisdictions involving nonassignable tort
causes of action which have reached the opposite result, mea-
suring the assignee's priority not from the time of the assign-
ment but from the time the claim is liquidated.21 4 It must also
be noted that even if priority is to be measured from the time
of the assignment, this does not insure priority over all third
persons. In some jurisdictions it would be necessary to notify
the tortfeasor of the assignment in order to perfect it against
subsequent assignees. This and many other pitfalls are con-
cealed in the law of assignments, but these are the sort of
matters which, as mentioned above, are adequately covered by
other works.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It was inevitable that attempts would be made to transfer
tort claims for personal and commercial purposes given the
frequency with which they arise and their potential value. The
and a subsequent judgment creditor are consistent in result with Williams. See, e.g.,
Neilson Realty Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 262 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup.
Ct. 1965) (citing others). Contra, In re Wood's Estate, 144 N.Y.S.2d 880 (Sur. Ct.
1955). See generally Greenberger, Contracts, Annual Survey of New York Law, 19
SYRACUSE L. REV. 373-74 n.53 (1967).
213 See generally Greenberger, Contracts, Annual Survey of New York Law, 20
SYRACUSE L. REV. 342 (1968). Cases in accord with Williams include: Gannon v.
American Airlines Inc., 251 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1958) (applying Oklahoma law); Linder
v. Lewis, Roca, Scoville & Beauchamp, 333 P.2d 286 (Ariz. 1958); Haupt v. Charlie's
Kosher Market, 112 P.2d 627 (Cal. 1941). It should be noted that the liens given
priority in these cases were held by attorneys through whose skills the fund was ulti-
mately produced, as was the lien in Williams. A court could find that the attorney's
role in bringing the fund into existence is a sufficient basis for distinguishing these
cases from a case in which the assignee was not an attorney. See Harvey v. Cleman,
400 P.2d 87 (Wash. 1965). Cf. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 410 P.2d 495, 500 (Ariz.
1966).
2" Cases contra to Williams include Harvey v. Cleman, 400 P.2d 87 (Wash. 1965)
and Di Giosio v. George, 44 Pa. D. & C. 668 (C.P. Allegheny 1942). For New York cases
contra to Williams, see note 212 supra. One should also not assume that an unliqui-
dated nonassignable tort claim can be the subject of attachment, execution, or garnish-
ment. See Woody's Olympia Lumber, Inc. v. Roney, 513 P.2d 849 (Wash. 1973).
25 See note 198 supra.
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law has evolved from the English prohibition of assignments of
all choses in action to its current American status where the
assignability of a tort claim is very often related to its surviv-
ability. Both statutes and case law reflect the notion that a
claim is transferable inter vivos by its owner if it would pass
to his personal representative upon his death.
The consequence of equating assignability with survivabil-
ity is that property-related torts are generally assignable while
personal torts are often nontransferable. In this respect, the law
has not kept pace with the times. The equivalency has been
adopted, for the most part, without serious evaluation, and few
legal principles have been applied for so long with so little
scrutiny. The reasons that may have once supported restricting
the transferability of tort claims, such as the fear of mainte-
nance and difficulties in valuation, are not persuasive in con-
temporary society.
Once it is determined that a tort cause of action is assign-
able, the law of assignments governs its transfer and its effect
on the parties inter se as well as on third persons. Because there
is no persuasive evidence that this body of law is unsatisfactory
as it applies to security assignments of tort claims and deriva-
tive rights, there is no basis for recommending that Article
Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code be amended to encom-
pass these rights as original collateral or proceeds. Their inclu-
sion could become warranted if such assignments take on suffi-
cient commercial importance in the future to justify a filing
requirement. Whether Article Nine would provide an appropri-
ate vehicle for giving notice of the security assignment of tort
claims and derivative rights remains to be fully evaluated.
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